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SUMMARY 
Correct decisions with respect to ocean-liner transport 
activities of Latin American and Caribbean countries require an 
understanding of the market, service, technological and legal forces 
which are changing the structure of the industry. These forces which 
are neither independent nor isolated and together constitute a 
discernible pattern which must be understood for survival. The 
central message of this document is not only that yesterday's 
ocean-liner structure is coming to an end but also that the ideas put 
forward about tomorrow's won't last forever either. To provide a 
basis for understanding such changes, this document presents an 
overview of the forces which are restructuring ocean-liner transport, 
problems which might result and suggests possible courses of action. 
Historically, all ocean cargoes were transported by liner 
vessels. When homogenous cargoes reached certain volumes they have 
been spun-off or separated from the remaining liner cargoes and began 
to be carried in specialized vessels under contractual or charter 
arrangements. General cargoes are non-homogenous and have resisted 
this trend, but with their carriage in standard marine containers they 
now present a homogenous transport unit. While the separation of 
containers will not occur in all trades, it is considered that in 
high-volume, balanced routes the process has already begun. This can 
be seen from the weakening of the liner conference system, the growing 
strength of non-conference lines, the increasing use of large-scale 
vessels and intermodal-landbridges, the development of new 
technologies and load-center ports, cronic overtonnaging and 
provisions in certain national legisation which support the spin-off 
or separation of containers from other liner cargoes. 
It response to these forces it is suggested that Latin American 
and Caribbean countries might wish to evaluate, among others, the 
possibility of collaborating to harmonize their individual liner 
policies and to establish subregional consortia. 

PREFACE 
With financing provided by the Government of the Netherlands, the 
Transport and Communications Division of ECLAC has undertaken studies 
of the market, service, technological and legal forces which are 
restructuring not only the ocean-liner industry but also its land 
transport counterpart. At present these studies are in an advanced 
state of preparation and should be completed during 1987. In 
recognition of the timeliness of such investigations and in response 
to an invitation from the Ecuadorian Navy to participate in the Latin 
American Seminar on Shipping Management, which was held at Guayaquil, 
Ecuador, from 21 to 25 July 1986, it was decided that an overview of 
the ocean-liner study would be presented. The seminar was organized 
by the Ecuadorian Navy and the Directorate General of Maritime 
Interests of Ecuador, and co-sponsored by the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
and ECLAC. 
In the changing world of ocean-liner transport, strategic 
planning is a must, but it is not enough. Planning implies 
undertaking activities which will assist in reaching preselected 
goals. To correctly identify such goals, strategic planning must be 
based on an indepth understanding or strategic vision of the forces 
-market, service, technological and legal- which are changing the 
industry. A strategic vision of the ocean-liner industry would 
provide at least partial answers to the questions; What do such 
forces mean for a specific line, country and region, and what measures 
should be taken in response thereto? 
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I. Introduction 
To say that ocean-liner transport is in a recession or even a 
depression is an obvious understatement when viewed from the 
perspective of the crisis environment in which the industry has 
operated for the last 10-12 years. Even though shipping executives 
are aware of the elements which make up this environment, many seem 
unaware that such elements are neither isolated nor unrelated and 
together constitute a discernible pattern which are restructuring the 
industry and must be understood for survival. 
Without an appreciation of the market, service, technological and 
legal forces that are restructuring the ocean-liner industry, shipping 
executives may act on assumptions that are out-of-date. If industry 
leaders are out of touch with the present, will they be able to 
understand and deal with the unfolding future? Trends are not destiny 
and if anticipated they can provide substantial opportunities. The 
decisional flexibility that trend anticipation provides in the short 
term can become decisional paralysis in the medium and long terms if 
not understood and properly utilized. Trend anticipation permits 
shipping lines to avoid forced choices and can reduce or eliminate the 
seemingly inevitable nature of the future. 
In the ever-changing scene of world trade and ocean-liner 
transport, many long-term projections of the early 1970s, and decision 
made thereon, have become almost irrelevant to the situation in the 
mid-1980s. Despite the assistance of computers, cluster diagrammes, 
mathematical models and matrices, any attempt to look at the future 
remains, as it must, more of an art than a science. To identify the 
trends presented in this document extensive use was made of the 
insight, vision and seasoned judgement of numerous industry 
specialists. Based upon the information provided by such specialists, 
the central message of this document is not only that yesterday's 
ocean-liner structure coming to an end but also that the ideas put 
forward about tomorrow's won't last forever either. For those ideas 
which prove incorrect, it should be understood that accuracy of 
predictions is of secondary importance to the broader issue of 
stimulating discussions. In fact, when dealing with the future being 
approximately correct and formulating appropriate questions to 
stimulate discussions are the fundamental goals sought. To stimulate 
discussions this document cannot and does not rest with 
generalizations, but rather takes enormous risks by making 
declarations and asking specific questions for which only the future 
can provide conclusive proof. 
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II. Services 
In a time of structural change ocean-liner transport must be 
approached differently if carriers are to remain viable. However, 
what that approach might be will be determined by a correct 
intrepretation of the service, market, technological and legal forces 
which are bringing about such changes. While all of these forces 
contribute to the restructuring of the ocean-liner industry, some of 
the more important aspects in the services area are related to (a) the 
impact of market forces on homogenous liner cargoes, (b) the fungible 
nature of container transport and its impact on conference, (c) 
intermodalism and the growing use of landbridges, (d) large-scale 
vessels, (e) load centering, (f) overtonnaging and (g) ocean-liner and 
commercial concentration. 
A. The impact of market forces on homogenous liner cargoes 
If one begins with the age of modern ocean transport, which 
started with the development of the steam engine and establishment of 
the liner conference system during the 1860s, the impact of market 
forces on homogenous liner cargoes can be clearly seen. During the 
early history of ocean-liner transport all cargoes were .carried by 
liner vessels -whether they were minerals, petroleum, grains, 
passengers or what is today referred to as general cargoes. 
Nonetheless, when the above homogenous cargoes and others such as 
automobiles, pipes, paper rolls and lumber reached appropriate 
volumes, they were spun-off or separated from ocean-liner transport 
and began to be carried in specialized vessels under contractual or 
charter arrangements. 
It is important to highlight that general cargoes have resisted 
this trend due to their non-homogenous nature and the need to handle 
and stow each individual unit. However, with the ever widening use of 
containers general cargoes now present a homogenous transport unit. 
The possible spin-off or separation of containers from ocean-liner 
transport and their carriage in specialized vessels under contract 
arrangements should be evaluated from two different viewpoints; that 
is, the volume and balance of containers in movement, and the 
frequency of service required by shippers and consignees. With 
reference to the first, it should be highlighted that just as not all 
automobiles are transported in the approximately 370 specialized 
pure-car carriers, not all containers will be separated from 
ocean-liner transport and carried under contract arrangements. 
However, on those high-volume routes where there exist a reasonable 
balance in flows, such a separation could occur. The volume and 
balance of flows must be weighed against the frequency requirements of 
shippers and consignees, but where such considerations can be 
harmonized even greater support will be given to a spin-off of 
containers from ocean-liner transport. 
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Historically specialized vessels carrying homogenous cargoes 
often made 50 per cent of their voyages in ballast. With increasing 
competition among contract carriers and the attendant need to reduce 
unremunerative voyages, naval architects began to develop flexible 
vessel designs which would permit the carriage of numerous other 
cargoes. With reference to container ships, features have been 
incorporated into such designs which permit the carriage of lumber, 
grains and minerals. Whether a balance in the flow of containers in a 
specific trade is required to support a spin-off or separation from 
ocean-liner transport must be understood in the light of the market 
trend to separate homogenous cargoes, which usually occurs without 
such balance, and the possibility of utilizing flexible vessel designs 
which facilitate the carriage of other cargoes to reduce and even 
eliminate ballast voyages. Due to the already flexible nature of 
container transport systems and cronic overtonnagins, which has 
created a shippers' market with excessive competition, it is 
considered that a reasonable container-flow balance or the 
availability of alternative cargoes should contribute to a spin-off or 
separation of containers from ocean-liner transport. 
It seems probable that the spin-off or separation of containers 
and their carriage under contract arrangements will permit 
manufacturers, integrated trading companies and others to view 
transport as part of their purchasing, marketing and stock 
departments, with cargo owners and carriers jointly devising systems 
and procedures to reduce cargo damage and ensure timely deliveries. 
Cargo owners will seek creative and innovative transport partners who 
will share risks and awards, as well as offer total co-operation in 
order to obtain the objectives of safe product transport,, economy, 
forward, planning, incorporation of new technologies and expanded use 
of information systems. In recognition of this trend the executive 
director of the US Atlantic North Europe Conference has indicated that 
such contracts will become more sophisticated and regularly renewed 
every two-to-three years. 
The trend to spin-off or separate homogenous cargoes from 
ocean-liner transport has continued without interruption since the 
1880s when the first petroleum tanker was constructed and must be 
carefully interpreted in the light of its possible impact on 
containers. It might be argued that the trend to separate homogenous 
cargoes from ocean-liner carriage might not be applicable to 
containers, as they are homogenous transport units rather than a 
homogenous cargo. Another argument might be that homogenous cargoes 
are usually carried for a reduced number of shippers and consignees, 
while containers can involve numerous shippers and consignees. 
Notwithstanding the cogency of these and many other arguments, 
numerous questions remain: Will these or any other factors be 
sufficient to preclude such separation? If it does occur, what will 
be the structure of the liner industry without containerized cargoes? 
Will the loss of container cargoes by liner companies result in the 
economic decline of the liner industry? 
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B. The fungible nature of container transport and its Impact on 
conferences 
Before the carriage of containers, it can be generally stated 
that ocean-liner companies offered a package of services with four 
common elements; that is, a technology, route, frequency and price. 
However, more important to shippers and consignees than these common 
elements provided by all lines were the service aspects involved in 
handling and stowage of general cargoes. The handling and stowage of 
such cargoes was an art as well as a science and required great 
experience to place compatible cargoes in the same hold and to 
appropriately stow them for ocean carriage. Shippers were known to 
forego vessels of one company specifically because they knew their 
cargoes would be better cared for by another. 
With the growing use of containers in ocean-liner transport most 
companies which operate cellular vessels are no longer involved in the 
handling and stowage of general cargoes. In fact, to an ever 
increasing extent these functions are usually carried out at interior 
cargo terminals and factories where containers are filled and emptied. 
Such a change appears minimal but its impact is enormous; that is, 
without the service aspects of cargo handling and stowage .ocean-liner 
transport has become a fungible or totally interchangable commodity. 
Where different shipping companies offer similar vessel technologies, 
routes, frequencies and prices, ocean-liner services have become 
identical. As a result, conferences exercise much less control over 
carriers than in the era of general cargo vessels. In an age of 
fungible transport services a greater degree of control lies in the 
hands of cargo owners, few of whom operate liner vessels, and 
differences between lines are a less significant factor when choosing 
a carrier. In fact, probably the most important lesson to be learned 
from the fungible nature of ocean-liner transport is that a shipping 
company does not need the 125 years of experience of Hapag-Lloyd to 
successfully engage in ocean-liner transport. 
The growing influence of non-conference carriers and the 
weakening of the liner conference system are directly related to the 
fungible nature of ocean-liner transport of containers. For example, 
when containers were introduced into Australian trades in the early 
1970s, liner conferences were estimated to have carried slightly in 
excess of 90 per cent of all cargoes. By 1985 that amount had fallen 
to 70 per cent. Another example would be the trade from France, Italy 
and Spain to the US. The Mediterranean-USA Conference controls only 
about 50 per cent of that trade and is to be dissolved 30 September 
1986, unless an understanding is reached with non-conference carriers 
Evergreen Line (EL) and Maersk Line. These lines have a combined 
share of the Italy-USA market of 24 per cent. Representatives of EL 
have indicated that while its rates are approximately 20 per cent 
below those of conferences, the line will operate profitably. It 
should be highlighted that in a period of less than 10 years EL 
established east and westbound round-the-world (RTW) services, three 
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end-to-end services (trans-Pacific, trans-Atlantic and Asia/Europe), 
numerous feeder services and inland transport arrangements. Due to 
the fungible or commodity nature of ocean-liner transport, where 
competing companies offer the same technology, route and frequency, 
price has become the deciding factor in the selection of carriers. 
As can be seen from the following diagram, modern liner 
conferences are composed of three distinct parts; that is, consortia, 
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While the reasons for establishment of general cargo conferences are 
well known and documented, most commentators consider that the 
creation of consortia and rate agreements are merely an extension of 
the original conference framework. However, these new arrangements 
have come about due to a myriad of factors such as the fungible or 
identical nature of container transport systems, new legal regimes 
such as the US Shipping Act of 1984, intermodalism, large-scale 
vessels, overtonnaging and declining trade volumes, which are 
exogenous to and often in contradiction with the conference system. 
In this most international of businesses, shipping lines without 
joint operating arrangements with other ocean carriers are the 
exception rather than the rule. Ship operators have gone from total 
independence and a loose amalgamation in the form of general cargo 
conferences to tighter relationships such as consortia, 
container-space (slot) chartering and joint marketing arrangements. 
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To establish a consortia, MNLs or joint operating arrangements there 
must be a willingness to compromise among participating liner 
companies in areas such as objectives, ownership of shares, 
investments -types, amounts and frequency, duration and financial 
compensation. The need to compromise does not necessairly mean that 
national interests will not be satisfied, but such objectives should 
be evaluated in the light of national interests. 
A fundamental corollary of the need to compromise in order to 
achieve common objectives is the requirement that participants utilize 
or combine the inherent advantages and least cost factors available to 
each. The search for least cost factors could give rise to MNLs on a 
global scale. For instance, the flag or even the ownership of a 
vessel could become meaningless when a ship is crewed in one country, 
managed from another, financed elsewhere and is part of an 
international distribution chain which might see the ship operating 
between two other countries for its economic life. The question then 
becomes, how can national maritime policies be elaborated to take into 
account not only national interests but also the trend towards tighter 
and larger relationships between liner operators? 
If the trend towards ever tighter relationships between liner 
operators continues, Latin American liner operators run the very real 
risk of becoming part of large MNLs. Currently, vessel operators of 
this region are slowly being absorbed into extra-regional consortia, 
with the attendant risk of becoming minority stockholders or single 
vessel operators in resulting MNLs. This could mean a loss of control 
over their ocean-liner activities and the important role of shipping 
in trade promotion. The long-term impact of this trend must be 
carefully studied in order to answer numerous questions such as what 
is an appropriate presence in ocean-liner transport for Latin American 
and Caribbean countries and what would be the response of MNLs to the 
individual transport needs of such countries? Responses to these and 
other questions will assist shipping lines and governments of this 
region to elaborate a common ocean-liner transport policy. 
Rate agreements have replaced the traditional conferences on 
numerous trade routes, such as those to and from the USA. A major 
reason for this is that the US Shipping Act of 1984 has given 
individual lines numerous new tools which enable them to respond more 
rapidly to shippers' requirements. These legislative tools include 
the right to quote independent freight rates, enter into service 
contracts and to offer time/volume rates. Service contracts are 
agreements by which a shipper or group of shippers offer a certain 
volume of cargo in exchange for a guaranteed rate and service 
commitment from a carrier, that have resulted in liner tariffs 
becoming increasingly meaningless. Without the traditional conference 
powers to ensure compliance with standard rates and to minimize 
competition, rate agreements have become "talking shops" for carriers. 
As containers are spun-off or separated from other conference cargoes 
in high-volume routes, rate agreements could evolve into meeting 
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places for owners' and charters' brokers to negotiate and formalize 
contractual arrangements for the carriage of containers. 
C. Intermodalism and the growing use of landbridges 
The historical meaning of intermodal transport was simply the 
transfer of goods between different modes, whereas today it implies a 
systems approach to all activities and functions in the distribution 
chain to reduce and, where possible, eliminate interruptions in the 
continuous movement of goods from origin to destination. The entire 
distribution chain, in which liner transport is but one link, has 
taken on greater importance as the value of goods carried has 
increased. Intermodalism is an integrative way of dealing with the 
distribution chain to increase its potential; that is, it involves 
the co-ordination of distribution chain activities in order to create 
circumstances in which the underlying cost structure is lower than the 
sum of service costs of each individual activity. It is a service 
innovation which redraws the market boundaries of shipping lines, 
conferences and ports to enable carriers to penetrate areas 
traditionally served by competitors operating out of a different range 
of ports. No distribution chain activity can be treated in isolation, 
as each has a number of interfaces with others that can .produce or 
eliminate system efficiencies. For example, ports can spend endless 
sums of money on facilities and market them at reduced rates to bring 
shipping lines to their berths only to find that carriers go elsewhere 
because Customs are more co-operative. Without the "system 
optimization" provided by intermodalism, the whole can be very much 
less than the sum of its parts. 
On the other hand, multimodal transport is an institutional 
concept which involves the issue of one bill of lading by a multimodal 
transport operator (MTO) who assumes responsibility as a principal, 
not as an agent, for the entire transport operation from origin to 
destination. This does not mean that a MTO can not seek to eliminate 
breaks in carriage operations and integrate distribution chain 
functions, but when such efforts are made the MTO is combining 
intermodal functions with the institutional, multimodal concept. 
To take full advantage of the systems approach, intermodalism 
requires the creation of structural ties between each of the 
activities in the distribution chain. To do this certain institutions 
must be created, while others must be modified and/or strengthened, 
but the most important changes are related to the reduction, 
simplification and harmonization of trade procedures and requirements 
of national Customs authorities, banks and insurance companies, and 
the use of computers and information technology to bring the diverse 
elements of the distribution chain together in order that they might 
function as a system. 
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The establishment of intermodal systems does not seem to 
represent a logical extention of the ocean-liner industry, as many 
European and US lines have indicated they do not wish to engage in 
inland transport operations, but rather a radical shift of direction, 
often a negation, of earlier operating procedures. American President 
Lines (APL) offers Asian and US shippers an intermodal system which 
utilizes the US landbridge and articulated railway wagons that permit 
the carriage of containers stacked two-high. This arrangement allows 
containers to be delivered to US east coast destinations 86 hours 
after being discharged from vessels on the west coast, which is three 
and one-half days earlier and less costly than the all water route. 
Rail-ship intermodal operations require a great deal of schedule 
co-ordination. For shipping lines which operate on a weekly schedule, 
even a miminal delay in the return of a train to the US west coast 
could make a second set of double-stack container wagons necessary. 
APL has estimated that its intermodal-landbridge arrangements have 
resulted in savings from inland activities of approximately 40 per 
cent and a system savings of about 25 per cent. 
When speaking of the US landbridge it is important to clarify the 
routes utilized for eastbound, westbound and northbound cargo 
movements. With reference to eastbound cargo flows, there . are three 
major routes; that is, (1) northern -US Pacific Northwest ports to 
Chicago, Illinois, and US North Atlantic ports, (2) mixed -US Pacific 
Southwest ports to Chicago and US North Atlantic ports, and (3) 
southern -US Pacific Southwest ports to US Gulf and US South Atlantic 
ports. Presently there are approximately 21 block trains which carry 
over 400 TEUs each and depart US Pacific ports on a weekly basis. The 
quantity of containers filled with imports which move eastbound from 
those ports has been estimated at 10 000 TEUs per week on double-stack 
container trains, which is approximately 25 per cent of all US 
intermodal movements. The ocean-liner companies which take advantage 
of US eastbound intermodal movements include the domestic lines of 
that country as well as those from Asia and many cross traders. For 
example, Mitsui O.S.K. Lines and Southern Pacific Transportation 
Company (railroad) began a double-stack container service from Los 
Angeles, California, to Chicago during January 1986 and claim that the 
overall transit time from Tokyo, Japan, to Chicago is just 14 days. 
On the other hand, westbound there are routes from US Atlantic ports 
to US and Canadian interior destinations such as Chicago Houston, 
Texas, and New Orleans, Louisiana, and Montreal, Canada. Finally, the 
US Gulf ports of Houston and New Orleans currently offer traditional 
container on railway flatcar (COFC) services to many northern 
destinations. 
Even though the US landbridge has proven extremely popular for 
liner operators worldwide, it has been estimated that double-stack 
container systems may capture only 40 per cent of the COFC and road 
trailer on flatcar (TOFC) market. Due to the tremendous quantity of 
containers filled with imported goods moving eastbound each week from 
US Pacific ports to inland destinations, there is a pressing need to 
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locate cargoes -both domestic and export- for the return trip. A 
crucial element in double-stack container operations is locating 
cargoes at inland destinations for a remunerative backhaul. To ensure 
the availability of such cargoes, APL purchased three domestic freight 
brokers from the Brae Corporation in 1985, established AP Intermodal 
and AP Domestic, and engages in an extensive marketing programme. 
Other landbridges on the American Continent include those of 
Canada, Mexico, Panama and various South American alternatives. In 
recognition of the benefits of double-stack intermodal movements of 
containers, during August 1986 the Government of Canada completed the 
construction of new routes between Calgary, Alberta, and Vancouver, 
British Colombia, on the west coast. The purpose of this undertaking 
was to lower track gradients from 2.44 to 1.0 per cent, which reduces 
the number of locomotives required, double track parts of the route, 
reduce track curvatures and construct two tunnels at the Rogers Pass 
in the Canadian Rockies, one of 1.9 klms and another of 14.7 klm, in 
order to facilitate the use of double-stack container trains. Alberta 
Intermodal Services, a company established by the Government of the 
Canadian province of Alberta to co-ordinate the movement of containers 
from Calgary and Edmonton to Pacific Northwest ports, indicated that 
it moved 6 000 TEUs during the first five months of 1986. .This volume 
of containers exceeded forecasts by 10 per cent. 
The Mexican landbridge is located at the Gulf Tehuantepec, 
between the ports of Salina Cruz and Coatzacoalcos, and was 
inaugurated during April 1982. The terminal ports of the Mexican 
landbridge do not have a substantial hinterland, as is the case with 
those of Canada and the US, and offers its services as a true "bridge" 
between two ocean movements. Panama has sought to build upon the 
large amount of shipping which utilizes its Canal by offering 
landbridges across the Isthmus for various types of cargoes. These 
landbridges form part of what the Government of Panama calls its 
center-port-concept or centerport. This concept involves the 
integration of Atlantic and Pacific ports with land, railway and 
pipeline transport systems,, and the use of its character as an 
entrepot, for the movement of goods between oceans, as well as their 
storage and transformation. Finally, efforts have been made to use 
numerous routes between the east and west coasts of South America. 
Most recently Argentine wheat was transported by railroad from that 
country to Antofagasta, Chile, and at this latter port loaded aboard 
ship for carriage to Mexico. The Andes have always been a physical 
barrier to commercial exchanges, and in this movement it was no 
exception. Upon reaching the foothills the 30 car trains had to be 
broken down into units of 10 and pulled by multiple locomotives over 
the mountains. 
The other major landbridge is the trans-Siberian (TSL) which 
presently carries 20 per cent of Japan and South Korean trade to 
Europe on block trains with a 30 day transit. Use of the TSL has been 
increasing since 1970 and currently has reached approximately 200 000 
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TEUs annually. With construction of a second trans-Siberian line 
almost complete it is estimated that transit times will be reduced 25 
per cent, since the average speed of trains will increase from 45 to 
60 klms per hour, and that 600 000 containers will be carried by the 
year 2000. During September 1982 Soyuztransit, the agency which 
operates the TSL, decided to demonstrate its potential and made the 
11 000 klm trip from the Far East port of Vostochny to Brest, Poland, 
in 12 days. This transit time should be compared with the ACE Group 
consortium which requires 29 days for the all-water route. With 
reference to rates the TSL is 10 to 20 per cent, and in some cases 30 
to 40 per cent, lower than those of conference carriers. As a partial 
response, conference members grant reductions of between 10 and 30 per 
cent to shippers of certain commodities who provide a regular volume 
of traffic. 
Numerous carriers and cargo owners make use of the TSL. As 
examples, the Japanese shipping company YS Line provides services 
between Asia and Europe only by the TSL. Finanglia Ferries, a joint 
venture of Finncarriers and United Baltic Corporation of the United 
Kingdom (UK), seeks to use the Finnish-Russian compatable rail gage as 
well as connections to provide cargoes for its vessels which trade 
between Kotka, Finland, the UK and continental Europe. The Japanese 
automobile manufacturer Nissan has recently begun to utilize both the 
TSL and specialized car carriers, but for a period of 10 years it made 
exclusive use of the TSL to move automobile spare parts from Japan to 
various Western European countries. During this time Nissan found 
that the rates and transit times were either less or comparable to 
those of conference carriers. The reason for Nissan's change is 
related to European import limitations for assembled automobiles and 
the resulting need to fill its chartered vessels. 
One can only speculate on the impact the TSL could have on liner 
shipping in the Asia-Europe trade if, for example, transit times were 
a consistent 20 days and double-stack container wagons were utilized. 
A transit time of 20 days is possible, as the 25 per cent increase in 
train speed should result in a reduction of transit times to 22.5 
days. The considerations regarding the use of double-stack container 
wagons on the TSL would probably be the same as those for almost any 
other landbridge; that is, the distances containers would be carried, 
the volume of demand, availability of backhaul cargoes and the cost to 
remove physical obstacles. It should be kept in mind that where 
technological innovations result in cost savings and/or increases in 
efficiency, they have a way of imposing themselves on existing 
systems. Thus, one might ask if TSL productivity increases, which 
result from double tracking and double-stack container wagons, would 
be sufficient to make 20 per cent of existing liner vessels in 
Asia-Europe trades redundant? If so, in which alternative trades 
would those vessels seek employment? 
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The impact of landbridges and intermodalism on the demand for 
ocean-liner services will be enormous, but the potential of such 
arrangements on vessel designs, trade routes and trading economics 
could even be greater. Indeed, such potential might be compared with 
the changes brought about by the opening of the Panama (1914) and Suez 
Canals (1869). It will be remembered that these canals changed 
locational linkages between production and consumption, brought 
together geographically distant markets, modified the cost structure 
of transport, influenced the maximum dimensions of vessels and greatly 
reduced the volume of shipping services utilizing trade routes via 
Cape Horn and the Cape of Good Hope. While landbridges will not 
divert all liner traffic, as did the canals, it would appear that 
landbridges could take a large part of such traffic. In the light of 
a possible decrease in demand for liner services brought about by the 
growing use of landbridges, one should ask if the liner industry is on 
the threshold of a world fleet reduction similar to that when cellular 
ships displaced their general cargo counterparts? 
D. Large-scale vessels 
Economies of scale refer to a reduction of average production 
costs as the size of a plant increases. Applied to liner shipping 
this would mean increasing vessels sizes to lower average transport 
costs per container. Full explotation of economies of scale in the 
ocean-liner industry is limited by the magnitude of demand for 
transport services. For an individual liner operator this means that 
the overall demand in the trade routes served must be measured against 
factors such as competition, frequency requirements of shippers and 
consignees, seasonality of cargo flows, etc. In this sense,, economies 
of scale in ocean-liner shipping can exist at almost any vessel 
capacity range. For example, short-sea transport operators might have 
economies of scale at a maximum of 250 TEUs, whereas deep-sea 
operators in north/south trades could have 1 500 TEUs and those 
dedicated to east/west trades might reach 3 000 TEUs. In liner 
shipping scale-economy vessels are those which lower the average 
transport cost per container and, at the same time, reflect trade 
characteristics in areas such as types and volumes of cargoes in 
movement, degree of imbalance, frequency requirements of shippers and 
consignees, actual and projected competition, etc. 
For over 100 years any attempt by liner vessel operators to 
reflect the characteristics of trade demand and reach new scale 
economy levels was restricted by slow loading and discharge rates of 
general cargo vessels. Containerization did not eliminate this 
restriction, but rather raised it to permit the size of ocean-liner 
vessels to be increased considerably. For example, a general cargo 
vessel of approximately 10 000 DWT requires five days and nights to 
load and a similar period to discharge the same cargoes. On the other 
hand, cellular container vessels of twice the size generally require 
only one-fifth of that time or one day. 
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Larger vessels permit operating costs to increase at less than 
linear parity with freight rates. Vessel design and technical 
advances have been made which reduce transports cost per container per 
mile and permit large vessels to earn profits or lose less when 
smaller vessel would do worse. Nonetheless, in a market with 
declining trade volumes the matching of vessel cargo needs to achieve 
an adequate return on investment with the frequency requirements of 
shippers and consignees may become impossible. For instance, the 
Lorenzo Shipping Corporation (LSC) operates a fleet of 48-60 TEU 
vessels in the Philippine inter-island trades. With a decline in 
inter-island trade volumes LSC competitors operating 500 TEU vessels 
have gone bankrupt, as they had to wait for additional cargoes to fill 
their vessels and could not maintain the frequency required by 
shippers and consignees. LSC not only maintains the desired frequency 
but also a reasonably profitable operation. 
With the arrival of the RTW services of EL and US Lines (USL), 
numerous European and US ship operators as well as those of this 
region believe that they face the very real risk of forced 
rationalizations or becoming mere feeder operators for those services. 
USL utilizes 12 vessels of 4 258 TEUs in its eastbound service, while 
EL employes 22 vessels of 2 728 TEUs in its east and westbound 
services. Both of these lines offer traditional end-to-end, 
ocean-feeder and inland transport services. 
In general terms, when selecting a vessel for an ocean-liner 
service three dimensions are normally considered; that is, (1) costs 
-operating, investment, charter, etc., (2) physical limits -ports, 
canals, etc., and (3) trade requirements -volume of goods,, degree of 
imbalance, frequency needs of shippers and consignees, competition, 
etc. USL obtained a very low container cost per mile (US$ 0.034 at 
100 per cent utilization) with the above vessels and constructed all 
12 to PANAMAX limits. These vessels were designed for a crude 
petroleum price of approximately US$ 30 per barrel and, as a result, 
have a maximum speed of 18 knots. With the reduction in the price of 
crude petroleum to US$ 10 and even less, this speed has become 
uncompetitive. With reference to the policy of constructing large, 
energy-efficient vessels, it will be recalled that the current owner 
of USL, Malcom McLean, was the owner of Sea-Land Services until its 
sale to R.J. Reynolds Industries. While owner of Sea-Land and prior 
to the era of expensive oil he constructed large (at that time), 
energy-inefficient vessels -the famous 33 knot "energy-hungry" SL7 
container ships. As these foreign built vessels subsequently became 
uneconomic to operate, they were sold the US Government, converted and 
placed in its national defense fleet. 
Time will only tell whether USL has correctly matched the 
characteristics of its large-scale vessels with trade requirements, 
but it can be advanced that during 1985 USL lost US$ 66.7 millon, 
another US$ 72.17 millon during the first quarter of 1986 and expects 
a loss of the same magnitude for the second quarter of the same year. 
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It would appear that greater consideration might have been given to 
other cost aspects and trade requirements. Due to such losses USL 
renegotiated its loan agreements, and is to prepay three years of 
first mortgage loans on its 12 large-scale vessels and defer other 
debt payments over the next two years. The extent to which the US 
Government views USL vessels as part of its overall maritime policy 
must also be considered, as this could determine the availability of 
subsidies, a sale and leaseback arrangement or another purchase for 
its national defense fleet. 
E. Load centering 
As the simplicity and economy of containerization can be lost 
through port-to-port movements, numerous factors such as large-scale 
vessels, increasing cost-effectiveness of land transport services, 
efficient ports and simplifed Customs and other trade requirements 
have greatly expanded the traditional hinterland of ports. For 
example, the port of Houston, on the US Gulf Coast, finds its major 
competitors to be the west coast ports of Los Angeles and Oakland, 
California, and the east coast ports of Jacksonville, Florida, 
Savannah, Georgia, and Norfolk, Virginia. The expansion of one port's 
hinterland means that it will begin to draw cargo which historically 
flowed through another port. The increase in demand for the services 
of certain ports will result in their becoming transshipment, load or 
hub centers for other ports. 
Ship operators take many factors into account when determining 
whether a specific port will be served directly or by a feeder 
arrangement, but probably the most important is related to the volume, 
balance and stability of cargo flows. It is interesting to note that 
during the late 1960s Singapore was foreseen as the transshipment 
center for all Australia. Due to sufficient cargo volumes to 
commercially justify direct vessel calls, this did not come to pass. 
Moreover, certain ports of Australia have resisted the trend towards 
load-centering. For example, the south coast port of Adelaide made 
various efforts over a period of 10 years to obtain the cargo volumes 
needed and now receives limited direct vessel calls. Under present 
conference arrangements approximately 50 per cent of containers 
originating at and destined to Adelaide are carried by vessels which 
call at Melbourne on the southeast coast and transported between those 
ports by Victoria Railways. The other factors ship operators consider 
are distance of a port from the normal vessel route, port facilities, 
costs and efficiency, vessel turnaround time, inland transport 
connections and proximity to other ports with greater cargo volumes. 
The above described trend towards load-center ports is real, but 
its impact in east/west, and north/south liner trades could be quite 
distinct. East/west trades, which are usually between developed 
countries, present carriers with a reasonably balanced, large flow of 
high-value cargoes. On the other hand, north/south trades between 
developed and developing nations are generally unbalanced with a wide 
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range of cargoes which often provide only minimal compensation. 
Likewise, origin and destination countries in east/west trades have 
extensive inland transport infrastructures and legal regimes which 
permit the rapid flow of goods between interior points and ports, 
whereas in north/south trades such infrastructures and legal regimes 
have only begun to be placed in operation. Further, distances between 
the principal Latin American ports are greater than those of Asia, 
Europe and North America. Due to north/south trade characteristics, 
the lack of inland transport infrastructures and institutions and 
greater distances between ports, vessel operators should continue to 
make direct calls for the foreseeable future. 
F. Qvertonnaqinq 
Between 1970 and 1984 world seaborne trade grew by 32 per cent, 
while the size of the world merchant fleet increased by more that 100 
per cent. By type of vessel, the world-wide surplus is approximately 
36 per cent for tankers, 22 per cent for dry-bulk carriers and 33 per 
cent for container ships. Freight rates for many types of ocean-liner 
cargoes are less than a third of what they were five years ago. The 
fall in freight rates probably understates the extent of the overall 
reduction; that is, five years ago rates were generally quoted for 
port-to-port carriage, while today these same rates often include 
inland movements. With the spin-off or separation of containers from 
liner shipping and their transport by contractual arrangements, as was 
mentioned at parts II.A. and B., container ship capacity and demand 
might be more easily matched and result in even greater overtonnaging. 
In this situation it is unlikely that rates will provide liner 
operators an acceptable return-on-investment until a balance is 
restored between the demand and supply of shipping services, and many 
commentators do not expect this to happen before the mid-1990s. 
With decreasing cargo volumes in numerous trades, an excess of 
transport capacity and reduced freight rates, a major question comes 
to mind: Why are there so many new vessels? While each person would 
have a response based on his view of the industry, it would seem that 
the answer is focused in three related areas; that is, (1) large new 
vessels with technical advances which significantly lower operating 
costs, (2) an excess of shipbuilding capacity which is supported by 
governments and banks, and (3) an oversupply of funds from governments 
and banks to lines and shipbuilders. This situation has created a 
vicious circle in which lines must buy technologically advanced, 
larger vessels to remain competitive, but without funds they seek 
assistance from their banks and governments. The banks and 
governments, which have become or are owners of the lines, must 
provide the funds or accept bankruptcy of their lines. In order to 
utilize the funds nationally and to avoid unemployment at domestic 
shipyards, governments and banks usually finance the construction of 
new vessels at their shipyards. After adquiring new vessels, the 
older vessels are often not sold for scrap but rather to other 
shipping companies at reduced prices thereby adding to the oversupply 
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of transport capacity. 
Overtonnaging results in rationalizations and bankruptcies in the 
short and medium terms, but the greatest danger of this problem stems 
from its long-term impact on the critical mass of skills, institutions 
and equipment which support the industry. On the one hand shipping 
appears to be a dying or "sunset" industry with a continuous reduction 
in the number of vessels and employment opportunities, while on the 
other it has all the characteristics of a dynamic "high-tech" industry 
with technical and service innovations and legal regimes which permit 
new operating patterns and cross-modal mergers. Even though the 
critical mass is being redimensioned to conform to new realities, the 
attractiveness of the industry for a career is declining due to its 
"sunset" characteristics. It should be remembered that the existing 
community of seafarers has always recruited the next generation -they 
are the captains, chief mates, chief engineers and professors who make 
the industry known to others and thereafter train and guide their 
replacements. From a career point of view, rationalizations and 
bankruptcies create a disincentive for persons to enter the industry. 
Most governments and shipping lines consider that overtonnaging 
is a universal threat to the industry and that some form, of global 
action should be taken to deal with this situation. In addition to 
its impact on the critical mass, ocean-liner transport provides a 
central focus for almost all aspects of international trade. For 
example, international trading companies have indicated that without 
an operating presence in ocean-liner transport it would be very 
difficult to negotiate a favorable charter arrangement, understand 
what are acceptable losses from transport and even present an 
appropriate request for cargo insurance. It has been suggested by 
shipping interests of the United Kingdom that efforts should be 
undertaken to determine the minimum fleet size for that country and 
the needed levels of Government support. Thus, for both developed and 
developing countries ocean-liner transport provides an important 
learning environment that goes far beyond the mere movement of goods. 
G. Ocean-liner and commercial concentration 
With every increase in vessel, port and inland transport 
productivity there is an concomitant decrease in the required number 
of vessels, ports and inland transport equipment. The growing 
industrial concentration of ocean-liner transport can be seen from the 
arrival of large-scale vessels, load-center ports and the seemingly 
ever-increasing reach of inland transport systems. The major goal of 
such concentration is not the creation of monopolies, but rather 
economic survival through service rationalizations and economies of 
scale. It has been estimated that by the end of the century there 
will be only two liner carriers in Japan, one in Korea and three in 
the USA. This is to be accomplished through a decrease in the number 
of individual lines and vessels, but without a reduction in either 
service frequency or capacity. 
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In a similar manner, commercial exchanges are being concentrated 
in the hands of an ever-decreasing number of persons. This can be 
seen from declarations of carriers that 80 per cent of their cargoes 
come from less than 50 shippers. Moreover, the growing use of service 
contracts and shippers' associations contribute not only to the 
concentration of commercial activities but also to the strong 
negotiating power of cargo owners. Service contracts and shippers' 
associations permit the grouping of small quantities of cargo and the 
joint negotiation of freight rates. This joint negotiation is usually 
carried out by representatives of cargo owners, which again reduces 
the number of persons involved in commercial exchanges. In certain 
regions a close relation between cargo owners and carriers has always 
existed. For example, the major liner operators of Japan regard 
themselves as bound by custom to provide services to those 
destinations indicated by Japanese trading companies. 
The increasing concentration within the ocean-liner industry and 
the trade interests it serves should be evaluated in the light of a 
possible spin-off or separation of containers from other liner cargoes 
and their carriage under contractual or charter arrangements. If such 
a separation does occur, ocean-liner companies on high-volume routes 
will probably become part of the production and/or .consumption 
functions. These arrangements should permit greater efficiencies in 
distribution chain activities, but one might ask if this could lead to 
large multinational companies and transnational corporations as well 
as cartels controlling the comercialization of goods. Not all of the 
homogenous cargoes which have been spun-off from ocean-liner transport 
have fallen totally under such control. Nonetheless, joint ventures 
between Korean and US automobile manufacturers regarding the 
production and commercialization of Korean automobiles in the US, the 
purchase, transport and sale of bananas by Dole, Geest Industries and 
United Brands, and the control of oil prices by the Organization of 
Peroleum Exporting Countries are all examples of the need to study the 
relation between the growing concentration of trade and transport on 
the one hand, and the commercialization of goods on the other. 
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III. Ocean-liner technologies 
The history of containerization during the last three decades has 
shown that changes in ocean-liner technologies require a fairly long 
period of commercial, financial, legal and social acceptance. This 
period has also shown that technological advances in ocean-liner 
transport rarely follow a straight line path, but often proceed as 
part of a dynamic, lurching process. One might ask, what was the 
process that led to containerization and will it be repeated in the 
development of new ocean-liner technologies? 
From the point of view of transport, modern commercial 
transactions involve a split between producers and carriers. 
Production and transport are considered individual activities which 
are carried out by specialists in each field. In recognition of the 
cost and time savings possible from a partial closure of this split, 
Malcom McLean of McLean Trucking took a revolutionary step by 
developing a cargo unit which could be carried indistinctly by liner 
vespels, trucks and railroads. This closure involved the carriage of 
the same sacks, crates and barrels but, rather than individually, they 
were placed in large reusuable metal boxes which would come to be 
known as containers. The shipping line Mr. McLean .established 
demonstrates this partial closure with its name "Sea-Land" Services. 
Other ocean-liner carriers such as APL have taken this original 
initiative and further closed the split between production and 
transport by developing double-stack container wagons and creating an 
intermodal system of all links in its distribution chain -ports, 
vessels, Customs and inland transport services- between Asia and the 
US. 
The ocean-liner technologies which will be developed in the 
future should come about from a further closing of the split between 
production and transport. The final closing of the split may 
ultimately see ocean-liner companies becoming part of shippers' 
marketing functions and/or the consignees inventory activities through 
contract carriage arrangements, as was discussed in part II.A. It 
should be highlighted that in this situation international 
competitiveness may arise not so much from the comparative advantage 
of being a traditional seafaring nation but from the ability to 
integrate ocean-liner services into the production and consumption 
f unctions. 
The first step in this process should start with a change in the 
commercial dialogues which are carried out independently and range 
from those between financial institutions, shipbuilders and ship 
operators, to those between ship operators, cargo owners and ports, 
and finally those between cargo owners, ports and inland transport 
modes. In the future such dialogues will probably commence at the 
design, financing and ownership stages of new transport technologies 
and continue with vessel operations, modifications and even scrapping. 
For example, ship operators, shipbuilders, banks, cargo owners, ports 
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and Inland transport modes will establish a long-term relation based 
on the needs of a specific trade in order to reduce the lengthy 
process for acceptance of new vessel designs and, at the same time, 
create more cost-effective, specialized transport technologies. These 
technologies will reflect and will be modified to reflect the market, 
technological, service and legal forces which are continuously 
restructuring the ocean-liner industry. These changes in the 
traditional commercial dialogue process will bring about new 
technologies or new applications of existing ones in the following 
areas (a) vessels, (b) containers, (c) cranes and marshalling yards 
and (d) computers and communications. 
A. Vessel technologies 
While most industry specialists agree that major advances have 
been made in hull design and main-propulsion efficiency, few have 
evaluated the passive character or terminal inefficiency of cellular 
vessels during loading and discharge operations. For example, the 
preparation of a general cargo vessel for loading and discharge 
operations utilizes most of the crew and begins at sea with the 
rigging of booms and the partial opening of hatches. On the other 
hand, cellular vessels rely totally on port labor to prepare vessel 
for as well as carry out container handling operations. To reduce 
such passivity, some consideration might be given to vessel 
modifications which assist loading and discharge operations. For 
example, a "key stone" container slot might be created for each row, 
with movement of containers inside the vessel to and from such slots. 
These slots would receive from and deliver containers to the gantry 
crane, thereby reducing the enormous amount of crane travel time. 
Another vessel technology change which can be foreseen would be a 
closer relation between, for example, sources of financing, 
shipbuilders, ship operators, shippers, consignees and ports. 
Historically, general cargo vessels and even certain cellular vessels 
with their own cranes could be shifted between different trades as the 
demand for transport services changed. In fact, general cargo vessels 
were referred to as GALA or "go anyplace, load anything". If current 
trends continue, however, in the future liner vessels will become 
extremely inflexible; that is, they will be designed through 
collaboration of the above mentioned parties for specific uses 
(cargoes) and trades (routes and ports). 
The change of liner vessels from GALA to use and trade specific 
may be compared with a change from buying clothing at the Salvation 
Army to a boutique. It should be understood that the change from 
"Salvation Army shipping" to "boutique shipping" is quite profound for 
both developed and developing countries. Developed countries have 
historically looked to their developing counterparts for the sale of 
vessels which have been displaced technologically, but no longer can 
they be looked upon as potential purchasers of vessels which were 
designed for other u s e s and trades. Even the successful practice of 
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the Greek shipping fraternity to purchase second hand vessels and make 
extensive modifications should be questioned in the light of the 
market, service, technological and legal forces which are 
restructuring the industry. To create an economically viable, 
competitive liner fleet, developing countries must employ vessels 
which are designed for the specific cargoes and trades they wish to 
serve. 
It has been stated often that container ships are four to five 
times more productive than their general cargo counterparts. In 
practical terms this means that container vessels carry as much cargo 
and travel as many nautical miles in four to five years as did general 
cargo vessels in 20 years. Not only are container ships more 
productive than general cargo vessels, but overtonnaging, as discussed 
in part II.F., has given shipbuilders an incentive to make continuous 
and rapid advances in ocean-liner technology so that new vessels can 
be sold. Owners and operators should evaluate such advances to 
determine which of them might be incorporated into vessels to improve 
productivity -carry more cargo, decrease port-stay requirements, etc., 
and efficiency -reduce crew requirements, fuel consumption, etc. Just 
as the yearly financial statement determines the financial health of a 
carrier, a five year technical and economic evaluation could easily 
determine levels of obsolesence and the costs-benefits of needed 
modifications versus scrapping. In order to avoid the risks involved 
in ownership of vessels which may become technologically obsolete, 
many ocean carriers probably will charter rather than own the ships 
they operate, and will maintain an ongoing relation with financial 
institutions, shipbuilders and cargo owners to either modify or scrap 
chartered vessels when they are not the most cost-effective .means to 
meet cargo and trade needs. 
B. Container technologies 
Historically the maximum dimensions for land transport in the USA 
have always had a major influence on the marine container size. The 
factor which led to this is related to the pioneer status of US 
carriers in this field and the broad trade relations of that nation. 
For example, in 1956 Sea-Land Services (SLS) was the first shipping 
company to begin carrying containers and the dimensions selected was 
35' X 8' X 8'. This size were selected for two reasons: first, 35' 
was the maximum length permitted on roads of New York, New Jersey and 
Texas; and second, the 8' height was the maximum physically permitted 
on the then existing chasses for movements between New Jersey and New 
York via the Hudson Tunnel. Two years later Matson Navigation Company 
(MNC) began transporting containers with the same width and height but 
24' long on the US west coast for approximately the same reasons. 
In 1977 the ISO published its Recommendation 688 concerning 
dimensions for freight containers, which did not utilize either the 
35' or the 24' lengths as international standards. Nonetheless, the 
ISO considered that the range of sizes adopted (lengths of 10', 20', 
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30' and 40', with uniform 8' X 8' widths and heights) were 
sufficiently flexible to encompass the trades served by SLS and MNC. 
The impact of the ISO freight container dimensions on international 
container movements can be seen from the changes at SLS. For 20 years 
SLS utilized 35' containers, as its road transport services and 
container terminals are wholly owned and operated, but approximately 
10 years ago SLS began the costly process of changing from 35' to 40' 
lengths. By way of comparison, MNC is able to continue with the 24' 
length, as its services are limited to a domestic closed-loop between 
the US west coast and Hawaii. 
No longer are the US ocean-liner carriers the only pioneers in 
the industry, but the enormous trading potential of that nation and 
the growing use of intermodal systems in its trades, as was discussed 
in part II.C., have created a need to be compatible with inland 
transport systems of that country. It should be noted that the US 
Government adopted legislation entitled the "Surface Transportation 
Assistance Act of 1982" which increases the maximum dimensions for 
road transport in interstate movements to a length of 48' and a width 
of 8'6". This dimension was selected to increase the productivity of 
road transport vis-a-vis its rail competition, but its potential 
impact on international maritime transport must be carefully watched. 
Approximately five years ago APL began experimenting with non-ISO 
size marine containers in its intermodal transport system between 
Asia, US west coast ports, and interior as well as east coast 
destinations. The dimensions tested were 45' and 48' lengths, with 
the latter having a width of 8'6". From these experiments it was 
found the 48' X 8'6" X 9'6" containers have the following advantages: 
(1) an internal volume of 2.9 TEUs, (2) permit double-stack container 
platforms -five platforms equal one wagon- to carry 4.9 TEU instead of 
4.0 TEU and (3) permit two European standard pallets (1.2m X 0.8m) to 
be loaded side-by-side. In recognition of these advantages the 
Association of American Railroads (AAR) adopted this dimension as the 
US domestic container size; it is being tested by Canadian National 
Rail; numerous container manufacturers such as Jindo of South Korea 
and Synergen, Adamson and Yorkshire Marine in the United Kingdom have 
received orders for these new units; Sea Containers is acquiring 25 
units for leasing; and the European railway joint venture, 
Intercontainer, has 390, 2.5 meter (8' 2.5") wide units of various 
types and recently purchased thirty 40' ISO units with side-access 
doors of the same width for European trading. Units of 2.5m width are 
now being referred to as the trans-Atlantic or Europallet container. 
With all of the activity related to intermodal efficiencies and 
the 48' X 8'6" X 9'6" containers, ocean-liner carriers are faced with 
the following question: Is there a trend away from ISO standards? As 
a partial response to this question, it must be remembered that there 
are at present only 1 500 of these 48' units, which can be compared 
with almost 4 million standard ISO containers. Nonetheless, numerous 
shipping lines as well as the technical secretariat of ISO TC-104 
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consider that there is a real possibility of these units being 
utilized more extensively by Asian and European exporters to the USA. 
Due to the need for Latin American exporters to interface smoothly 
with land transport systems not only in the USA but also in Europe, 
and as the interface requirements of those markets are quite 
different, the commercial acceptance of this non-ISO unit must be 
carefully watched. 
C. Port and inland transport technologies 
There are a number of areas in which technologies are changing 
the traditional relation between liner vessels, ports and hinterlands. 
Some of the more important are related to (1) cranes and marshalling 
yards, and (2) inland transport. 
1. Crane and marshalling yard technologies. The research and 
development activities of crane manufacturers largely seek to reduce 
the time vessels spend in port loading and discharging containers, 
operating and maintenance costs, and the purchase price as well as 
installation costs. In this context numerous electronic aids have 
been added to, among others, increase travel speeds and assist in 
spotting containers -which is estimated to account for approximately 
50 per cent of cycle time. Specialists in the field project that by 
the end of this century major reductions in vessel port-stay times at 
high-throughput ports will be achieved by lifting containers in groups 
of eight or 10. The future may prove such projections correct but one 
might ask, what will be the cost of such multiple container moves and 
are there other less costly means to accomplish the same objective? 
A grane capable of lifting approximately 300 tons (10 containers 
with 30 tons each) would not only be very expensive but also heavy. 
Existing docks at even the most advanced ports might have to be 
reconstructed for such cranes as well as the point loading 
requirements of 10 containers. It should be noted that cranes of this 
capacity are usually on barges to eliminate the need for such special 
construction. Due to these and other aspects, it is considered that 
efforts might be fruitfully directed toward modifications of existing 
cranes which would increase their productivity. These efforts might 
indicate that major productivity increases could be obtained by a 
change from serial to simultaneous loading and discharge operations 
through, for example, the utilization of double-spreader cranes. A 
double-spreader crane would operate like a single-spreader, except 
that the former would lift ship and shore containers at the same time 
and the two units would rotate 90 degrees at mid-boom to permit such 
units to pass. Double-spreader cranes should be only marginally 
heavier that existing single-spreader units, thereby permitting the 
use of existing docks. 
The major advances for the marshalling areas of ports will 
probably involve electronic aids to assist in the identification, 
transmission and storage of information related to containers and 
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their cargoes. At those ports with a high throughput of containers 
the marshalling yards might be more closely integrated with the gantry 
crane through, for example, a conveyor or multiple trolley systems to 
ensure the rapid movement of such units to and from cranes. 
2. Inland transport technologies. From the earliest days of 
containerization extensive inland movement has always been a 
theoretical possibility, but numerous factors have combined to change 
that possibility into an economic and practical reality for Europe and 
North America. One of the most important factors which contributed to 
such change in North America was double-stack container wagons, which 
allow two ocean containers to be stacked atop each other for inland 
railway transport. 
Since the Second World War intra-European cargo movements have 
been dominated by road transport. The reasons for this are found in 
the virtual distruction of alternatives during the War, relative short 
transport distances, design advances of road transport equipment and 
low-cost petroleum products prior to 1973. During the early 1970s 
European railroads began to look at different alternatives which would 
allow them to participate in the intra-European movement of goods. As 
a result, the railroads began to develop intra-European, non-ISO, 
non-stackable containers of various lengths and heights, but usually 
2.5 meter (8' 2.5") wide, which are compatible with road transport 
requirements. These containers, or swap-bodies as they are called, 
are of light construction and have lifting points only at the bottom 
corners. Following the swap-body initiative, in 1983 European 
railroads combined to form a joint venture called Intercontainer for 
the transport of swap-bodies and ISO units between participating 
countries. Today 12 European nations participate in Intercontainer 
and approximately 50 per cent of all European COFC and TOFC movements 
utilize swap-bodies. During 1985 Intercontainer transported 
approximately 905 000 swap-bodies and ISO units, which is a 9.7 per 
cent increase over the previous year. 
While swap-bodies are not interchangable between land and sea 
modes, to a limited extent they are carried by trucks on 
roll-on/roll-off vessels in European short-sea trades. It has been 
estimated that a 30' swap-body constructed in Europe not only costs 
approximately US$ 3 600, or twice the price of a comparable ISO unit 
from a Far East manufacturer (US$ 1 500-1 800), but also is more 
expensive to repair. One specialist in the matter has suggested that 
if swap-bodies were replaced with ISO units it would ensure intermodal 
compatibility with ocean carriers and, at the same time, reduce 
investment and repair costs. During August 1986 technical committee 
104 (TC/104) of the ISO sent out a questionnaire to member countries 
concerning standards for swap-bodies and found that only 33 per cent 
consider such standardization necessary. With the advent of 
Europallet containers constructed to ISO standards, one might ask if 
swap-bodies will continue to be utilized for intra-European cargo 
movements in the medium and long terms. 
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On the other hand the USA has not, as yet, developed a domestic 
container such as the European swap-bodies, and until the early 1980s 
there was very little inland movement of ISO units. Inland transport 
in the USA of ISO containers became a practical reality with the 
deregulation of the road and rail transport industries in 1980. In 
general terms, the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 and the Staggers Rail Act 
of 1980 sought to remove bureaucratic constraints on competition and 
increase productivity through service and technological innovations. 
Since these acts were adopted loss making routes have been eliminated 
and new labor agreements have been negotiated, but the new maximum 
land transport dimensions, discussed in part III.B., and double-stack 
container railway wagons have been major contributors to such 
productivity increases. 
There are numerous variations in the design of double-stack 
container wagons, but it can be generally stated that such wagons are 
approximately 280' long and composed of five articulated platforms. 
Each platform carries four TEUs each, with 20 TEUs per wagon. Twenty 
double-stack container wagons are normally grouped to form a train 
which carries 400 TEUs. On the other hand, as APL utilizes one 48' X 
8'6" X 9'6" container on the second tier of each platform, the same 
train would carry 490 TEUs. Containers are secured for transport 
either by the use of bulkheads at each end of platforms or by the use 
of interbox connectors between the corner fittings of the base and 
stacked containers. A standard railway wagon weighs approximately 
31.9 metric tons, while the articulated double-stack container wagon 
only 14.6 metric tons or 54.2 per cent less. The reason for this is 
that a single five-platform, double-stack container wagon has 80 per 
cent fewer couplers and 40 per cent fewer wheels and brakes . that the 
equivalent five conventional flat railway wagons. This weight 
difference permits the same locomotive and, hence, crew to transport 
more cargo. 
It has been estimated that locomotives pulling double-stack 
container wagons will consume only 60-67 per cent as much fuel per 
container as conventional C0FC and TOFC operations. One US railroad 
has indicated that double-stack container wagons will average 225 000 
miles per year, instead of the 80 000 miles per years for flatbed 
railway wagons, and that double-stack container wagon maintenance 
costs, on a per-container basis, are as low as 12 per cent of those 
for conventional equipment. The per-container line haul cost savings 
of double-stack container trains over conventional TOFC and COFC is 
approximately 40 per cent, which results in an estimated rail-haul 
cost of US$ 0.40 per mile per container. 
The European and USA initiatives in inland transport technologies 
are important to Latin American and Caribbean countries, as they must 
have a smooth interface with each. This creates numerous problems as 
these technologies are quite different and 48' X 8'6" X 9'6" units 
presently would not be permitted on most European roads. Nonetheless, 
Asian and European exporters might come to see the 48' length as a 
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means of making greater use of North American road and rail transport 
economies, while those of Europe have already begun to look at the 8' 
6" and 8' 2.5" (2.5m) widths as providing such economies with 
reference to their standard pallets. 
Computer and communication technologies 
In 1966 the international transport of containers was a matter of 
vision, but a mere four years later they had become the basis of 
ocean-liner transport. Twenty years later the use of computers in 
ocean-liner transport is often a matter of vision, but within a very 
short period of time computers will become the fundamental basis for 
operation and control of containers and their cargoes, charter 
arrangements, consortia and the diverse elements of the distribution 
chain itself. The ocean-liner industry has been slow to see the 
advantages of computer applications to their daily activities. 
Computers are no longer a "management aid" but rather a "production 
tool" which will accelerate the market, service, technological and 
legal forces which are now transforming liner shipping. The 
production tool and acceleration aspects of computers are so important 
that the impact of the silicon chip on liner shipping has been 
compared with that of the container in 1960. The areas in which 
computers find their greatest applications in ocean-liner transport 
are related to ship operations, container operations, communications 
between ships and ports, and communications between ports, inland 
transport modes, interior cargo terminals and national Customs 
authorities. 
Vessel applications include bridge, engineroom, cargo and 
administrative functions. Computers assist persons in each of those 
areas to gather, analyze, integrate and transmit data related to 
position, speed, weather, fuel consumption, repair functions, 
stability calculations, tank levels, draught, temperature, 
documentation, and accounts, as well as to carry out training, 
inventory and word processing activities. For example, computer 
applications to the repair cycle and functions have permitted a 30 per 
cent reduction in repair costs and a decrease in inventory investment 
requirements. 
Computers can assist shoreside container operations to ensure the 
maximum utilization of the cubic space in such units, prepare vessel 
loading plans, reduce restov?s, elaborate commercial documentation and 
control of container inventories. With reference to the latter, a 
European liner company has found, upon adopting a computerized 
inventory control system for containers, that its manual system 
resulted in as much as 25 per cent of such units not being ready for 
service. 
Communication technology permits vessels to communicate with 
ports regarding existing container stowage, tank contents, etc., so 
that the latter can prepare discharge and loading plans, determine 
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equipment requirements and identify shoreside storage locations for 
incoming and departing containers. These communication links are also 
utilized to provide information related to navigation and weather 
routing. In a similar manner the same technology permits ports to 
communicate with inland transport modes, interior cargo terminals and 
national Customs authorities. For example, Customs authorities can 
receive information regarding goods which are to enter and leave the 
country many days before the vessel arrives. With such information 
containers can be pre-selected for inspection, while others 
pre-cleared if all required documents have been filed. The North 
American railroad, Burlington Northern, automatically transmits data 
(without human intervention) concerning the containers, their contents 
and destinations on its trains to a computer at the US west coast port 
of Seattle, Washington, before they have departed Chicago for that 
port. 
Due to the growing interdependence of all activities in the 
distribution chain, which historically have been treated as unrelated, 
there is a pressing need to create structural ties between all modes 
and functions in order to take advantage of the benefits of "system 
optimization". Such structural ties can generally be grouped into two 
catagories; that is, those of an institutional nature and those of a 
physical nature. The role computers and communications technologies 
have come to play and will play in joining the diverse activities of 
the distribution chain to create a systems approach is generally 
understood, but what needs to be studied in greater detail is how 
these important production tools might be incorporated into the 
institutional and physical activities of land and water transport of 
this region. 
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IV. THE EMERGING LEGAL 
ENVIRONMENT OF OCEAN-LINER TRANSPORT 
Ocean-liner transport is such a dynamic and permanently evolving 
field that the legal regimes which govern its activities should be 
forward looking and, if possible, anticipate changes. In elaborating 
legal regimes for ocean-liner transport, most countries give 
consideration to the following three overlapping areas: 
I Commercial aspects 
I of liner shipping 
I I 
1 







The importance and relative weights given these areas by a country and 
the means utilized to satisfy each result in a statement of its 
ocean-liner transport policy -whether explicit or implicit. Due to 
the wide range of interests each of these areas represents, 
ocean-liner transport has an intimate relation with other government 
policies and it is in the political arena where one must first look 
for changes. Indeed, it might be said that the commercial aspects of 
ocean-liner shipping are controlled by non-market considerations 
-economic security and national defense- and any attempt to separate 
ocean-liner transport from the general economic, industrial and 
political environment is not only impossible but would result in a 
meaningless exercise. 
The relevance of this intimate relation can be seen from the 
service innovations which have come about in the last two-to-three 
years. To understand these innovations it should be highlighted that 
the physical elements of modern liner shipping -containers, 
specialized cranes, cellular vessels, etc.- have existed since the 
mid-1960s, but new legal regimes and those under discussion permit 
such elements to be utilized differently or in new combinations. This 
is something like rewriting the rule book for chess and permitting a 
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piece that could only move in two directions to now move in four or 
six or in combination with other pieces. The process of learning to 
operate liner vessels according to new and constantly evolving 
competition rules is not easy, but it is necessary for survival. 
In this context, the legal measures being elaborated or which 
have been adopted by (a) developed countries, (b) developing countries 
and (c) jointly by developed and developing countries must be 
evaluated to answer many questions. Some of the more important are: 
What impact will these regimes have on fleet development programmes 
and trading economics of Latin American and Caribbean countries? What 
organizational and operational changes are needed for Latin American 
and Caribbean shipping lines to anticipate the emerging legal 
environment of ocean-liner transport? Does the emerging legal 
environment accelerate, anticipate or restrict the market, service and 
technological forces which are restructuring the industry? What new 
commercial relationships should be created? Which old ones must be 
terminated? Until these and many other questions are answered liner 
companies will be compelled to operate in a political environment so 
disperse that they literally cannot tell from one day to the next what 
strategies and plans are most appropriate. 
A. Measures adopted by developed countries 
Probably the most important legislation adopted by developed 
countries for the ocean-liner industry are (1) the US Shipping Act of 
1984 and (2) the proposal to include liner shipping within the 
European Community's Treaty of Rome. Of course, there are many other 
legal instruments such as (3) Lomé III and (4) Note 1 to Annex A of 
the Code of Liberalization of Current Invisible Operations (CLIO), as 
well as (5) quasi-legal instruments which result from US/Consultive 
Shipping Group (CSG) discussions. 
1. The US Shipping Act of 1984. This Act is more than just 
another national law for three reasons: first, approximately 
two-thirds of all liner vessels call at US ports and, therefore, must 
comply with its requirements; second, the new tools it creates for 
the industry -service contracts, time-volume rates, independent 
action, extension of antitrust immunity to intermodal combinations and 
rates, shippers negotiating directly with lines, not via conferences, 
and shippers' associations- are supportive of the market, service and 
technological forces which are restructuring the industry; and third, 
lines may now respond rapidly to changes in trade demand, as all 
agreements filed with the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) -other 
than assessment agreements- become effective 45 days after filing, 
unless the FMC seeks injunctive relief. Due to the importance of this 
Act for ocean-liner transport, it will be evaluated with reference to 
(a) enforcement philosophy, (b) commercial implications, (c) national 
economic security and defense aspects, and (d) specific clauses of 
this and other related US maritime legislation which are of interest 
to ocean-liner companies. 
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a) Enforcement philosophy. Many articles and even books have 
been written in an effort to explain the Shipping Act of 1984. 
However, a spokesperson for the FMC at a conference sponsored by it 
and the Old Dominion University, 12-13 June 1986, held at Norfolk, 
Virginia, USA, indicated that 
"Whenever any industry is subjected to a major modification 
of the regulatory scheme under which it functioned for decades, 
it can be expected that it will take many years for the players 
to sort out all of the new information they receive about the 
changed environment and make the appropriate adjustments." 
It would appear that three situations must occur for the Act to be 
fully understood; that is, ocean-liner transport must be a (1) 
buyers' market, (2) a sellers' market, and (3) the FMC must have 
approximately 10 years to interpret the creative maneuvers of lines, 
conferences and shippers which seek to reduce what are seen as 
unnecessary burdens. Due to cronically overtonnaged trades, the 
growing use of intermodal-landbridges and large-scale vessels, and 
freight rates in real terms at 1977-1979 levels, the liner industry is 
currently a shippers' market. Until this situation is. reversed, 
numerous provision of the Act will not be utilized nor fully 
understood. Once the pendulum in this cyclical industry has swung to 
create a sellers' market, vessels operators will begin to see aspects 
of the second situation. 
With reference to the third situation, the Act provides for a 
five year review and establishment of a shipping line advisory group. 
The FMC itself has begun to gather information by questionnaires from 
seminar participants, liner operators and many others. Also, the FMC 
has begun to monitor trades, rather than gather information on a 
case-by-case basis, and this implies an even more active role for it 
in ocean-liner transport. For guidance in interpreting the Shipping 
Act of 1984, the FMC will be influenced by the legislative history of 
the Act, the large body of case law related to ocean-liner transport 
it has developed over the years, information from the trades it 
monitors and by the enforcement philosophy of the FMCs new Chairman 
-Mr. Edward V. Hickey. 
Mr. Hickey recently stated that he would do everything in his 
power to quickly and agressively employ statutory weapons contained in 
sections 13(b)(5) of the Shipping Act of 1984 and 19 of the Merchant 
Marine Act of 1920 when the circumstances warrant. The statutory 
weapons to which he referred will be treated at part IV.A.l.d). 
However, counterbalancing Mr. Hickey's declaration is section 
13(b)(6) of the Act which provides that 
"Before an order under this subsection becomes effective, 
it shall be immediately submitted to the President who may, 
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within 10 days after receiving it, disapprove the order if 
the President finds that disapproval is required for reasons 
of the national defense or the foreign policy of the United 
States." 
b) Commercial implications. The Act presents shippers with new 
opportunités to deal with carriers. Prior to the Act shippers could 
only negotiate with conferences, but now they can negotiate directly 
with any one line, a group of lines or the conference itself, as well 
as establish shippers' associations. These associations are defined 
at article 3(24) as 
"...a group of shippers that consolidates or distributes freight 
on a nonprofit basis for the members of the group in order to 
secure carload, truckload, or other volume rates or service 
contracts." 
The Act includes shippers' associations to balance the strengthened 
antitrust immunity of liner conferences and the negotiating power 
given large shippers through time-volume rates and service contracts. 
Without shippers' associations, liner operators would be able to 
recover any freight revenue lost through negotiations with large 
shippers by raising rates for shippers with small quantities of goods. 
In order to provide small shippers equal access to time-volume rates 
and service contracts, the Act provides that they may form 
associations and that carriers may not refuse to negotiate with such 
associations. The US Department of Justice has issued guidelines for 
its approval of such associations; that is, any one association 
should not control more than 35 per cent of cargoes on offer, and the 
transport cost should not exceed 20 per cent of the final commodity 
price. 
If the market, service, technological and legal forces which are 
restructuring ocean-liner transport result in a spin-off or separation 
of containers from the liner industry, service contracts and 
time-volume rates, as well as the earlier mentioned legislative tools, 
should support their carriage under contractual arrangements. An 
indication of such support can be seen from the 5 206 service 
contracts which were filed with the FMC by 2 May 1986, and from the 
FMC's declaration that in certain trades between the Far East and US 
over 50 per cent of all liner cargoes are now subject to service 
contract arrangements. It should be highlighted that 75 per cent of 
such contracts involve non-conference carriers, thereby indicating not 
only the growing strength of those carriers but also the impact of the 
forces which support the increasing use of service contracts. The use 
of service contracts is not restricted to US trades and, for example, 
Asian shippers to Europe are now demanding the right to use such new 
tools. Service contracts effectively incorporate liner companies into 
the physical distribution systems of shippers and consignees, thereby 
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permitting a reduction of their inventory investments through 
just-in-time deliveries. 
Some years from now academic discussions could be held concerning 
the weakening of the liner conference system and whether it was caused 
by the Shipping Act of 1984 or the nature of containers and 
ocean-liner transport services, as was presented at parts II„A. and 
B. It would appear, nonetheless, that challenges to conference 
supremacy are already well underway. It has been estimated that for a 
liner conference to stablize freight rates and minimize competition in 
a trade route, its members must control approximately 80-90 per cent 
of the cargoes. The Far Eastern Freight Conference (FEFC), for 
example, recently indicated that 47 per cent of the eastbound and 37 
per cent of the westbound cargoes are now transported by 
non-conference carriers. Certain carriers have begun to regulate and 
prohibit the use of service contracts, as permitted at section 
4(a)(7), in response to shippers' demands for clauses in such 
contracts which require amendment of original agreements if a reduced 
freight rate is offered. The Asia North America Eastbound Rate 
Agreement (ANERA) has adopted service contract guidelines for its 
members. However, whether or not the Act contains a provision for 
service contracts is considered largely irrelevant, . as other 
homogenous cargoes such as petroleum, minerals, grains, automobiles, 
paper, lumber, etc., separated from liner shipping without earlier 
legal initiatives. Thus, the growing use of contract carriage 
arrangements for ocean-liner transport reflect the market, service and 
technological forces which are restructuring the industry, and the 
Shipping Act of 1984 merely supports those forces. 
c) National economic security and defense aspects. For many 
years the US Government has maintained its national merchant marine 
through a combination of subsidies and cargo reservation regimes. As 
examples, US liner operators receive operating-differential subsidies 
and until recently construction-differential subsidies, as well as 
reservation regimes which are applicable to coastwise, military and 
economic assistance cargoes. With few notable exceptions, the 
magnitude of these subsidies and reservations regimes make US liner 
shipping one of the most protected of those in market-economy 
countries. Originally, each of the above measures sought to harmonize 
the commercial, economic security and defense aspects of its national 
maritime policy. Nonetheless, differences in interests among 
shipbuilders, ship operators, cargo owners, the armed forces and 
others has led the US Government to seek measures which individually 
treat those areas. 
With reference to the first or commercial aspects of 
international liner shipping, the operating-differential subsidy has 
created and perpetuates a fiction in US ocean-liner policy; that is, 
its international services are largely conducted on a commercial 
basis. With crew wages now reaching approximately 60 per cent of 
vessel operating cost, such is not the case. Crew wages not only 
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occupy a pivotal position in the daily expenses of US liner operators 
but the operating differential subsidy can make the difference between 
a profit or a loss. If the Liner Development Act (S-2662), current 
being considered by the US Senate, is approved, US liner operators 
would be allowed to buy, build and charter new tonnage on the open 
market, rather than from US shipbuilders, and yet still qualify for 
all existing subsidy payments. Wage subsidies would be calculated on 
a weighted index of crew costs for foreign vessels in competition with 
US flag vessels on a similar trade. There is nothing wrong with this 
fiction per se, as long as other countries which trade with the US are 
not required to structure their liner operations in accordance with 
it. 
In addition to the commercial fiction for international 
operations, the US Government also individually treats the remaining 
two areas -economic security and national defense- of its ocean-liner 
policy. Defense requirements are fulfilled through its Ready Reserve 
Force fleet, which is operated by the US Military Sealift Command, 
while economic security is considered adequately satisfied through US 
owned fleets that are registered under its laws as well as those of 
other countries. In a similar manner certain European nations with 
long experience in shipping and largely dedicated to cross-trading 
activities indicate that these three areas are treated separately. 
Indeed, at times such countries even deny that considerations are 
given to economic security and national defense issues. For such 
countries these latter issues are usually covered by economic union 
agreements, continental transport alternatives and mutual defense 
treaties which are of such magnitude as to eliminate any need for 
their consideration in an ocean-liner policy. These nations also 
assert that their fleets receive only interest equalization or local 
shipbuilding subsidies and cargo reservation for domestic trades, but 
the major subsidy comes from the internationalization of their fleets 
through the use of low-cost, foreign crews. 
The individual treatment of the commercial, economic security and 
national defense aspects of ocean-liner transport by the US and other 
developed nations has important implications for developing countries 
which either do not have sufficient means to deal with such aspects 
separately or have taken a national, sovereign decision to deal with 
them in another manner. The impact of the evolution from joint to 
individual treatment of the three areas of ocean-liner policy could be 
enormous for shipping lines of other countries, if access to their own 
trades with Europe and the USA is conditioned on use of substantially 
the same means to support their liner operators. 
d) Specific provisions of US maritime legislation which are of 
interest, to ocean-liner companies. To ensure access for US vessels in 
cross or non-US trades and for all vessels in direct US-foreign 
trades, sections 13(b)(5) of the Shipping Act of 1984 and 19 of the 
Merchant Marine Act of 1920, respectively, provide the FMC with broad 
powers. The regulations for these sections permit the FMC to 
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institute proceedings on its own motion or upon the filing of a 
petition. 
The regulations for section 13(b)(5) of the Shipping Act of 1984 
are found at 46 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 587 and enumerate 
conditions which are considered to unduly impair access of US vessels 
to trades between non—US ports, including any interroodal movements 
related thereto, and establish procedures under which US liner 
operators may apply to the FMC for relief. However, any limits, 
restrictions or requirements placed upon US vessels for participating 
in non-US trades will not be subject to FMC review unless a US liner 
operator is commercially able to enter the trade in question. 
As was noted at part IV.A.l.a), the enforcement of section 
13(b)(5) is limited by section 13(b)(6). Nonetheless, 46 CFR 587.2 
enumerates a wide range of conditions which are defined as unduly 
imparing the access of a US flag vessel to non-US trades. The two 
areas of fundamental interest for Latin American and Caribbean liner 
operators are those related to subparagraph (b) 
"Reservation of a substantial portion of the total cargo in the 
trade to national-flag or other vessels which results in a 
failure to provide reasonable competitive access to cargoes by 
U.S. flag vessels." 
and to the inclusion of intermodal movements in such transport 
operations. 
Pursuant to subparagraph (b), the FMC must define "... provide 
reasonable competitive access to cargoes by U.S. flag vessels" in the 
light of its reservation schemes for coastwise, military and economic 
assistance cargoes, as well as numerous bilateral cargo sharing 
agreements. Turning the requirements of this subparagraph around, 
does it mean that the US will eliminate such regimes and agreements in 
order to "provide reasonable competitive access to US cargoes by 
non-US flag vessels"? With reference to intermodal movements which 
form part of non-US trades, one can imagine, for example, USL's RTW 
service discharging Asian cargoes at Panama for on-carriage by its 
feeder vessels to either Chile or Peru and from one of those countries 
to La Paz, Bolivia, by land transport. Without clarifying decisions 
by FMC administrative law judges or policy statements by the Chairman 
of the FMC in these matters one can assume a certain intent but it is 
most difficult to determine the scope that will be given to the 
practical application of such provisions. 
The regulations for section 19 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1920, 
are found at 46 CFR 585 and define conditions resulting from actions 
of governments or from competitive methods or practices which are 
unfavorable to shipping in the foreign trade of the US. The 
definition of these conditions are quite similar to those of 46 CFR 
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587.2» and create two areas of interest for Latin American and 
Caribbean liner operators. The first is found at 46 CFR 585.3 (b) and 
relates to conditions which 
"Reserve substantial cargoes to the national flag or other 
vessels and fail to provide, on reasonable terms, for effective 
and equal access to such cargo by vessels in the foreign trade 
of the United States 
This subparagraph would seem to implicitly recognize the validity 
of national cargo reservation regimes, if such regimes provide, on 
reasonable terms, for effective and equal access to such cargo by 
other vessels in the foreign trade of the USA. It seems to indicate 
that only if cargo reservation regimes fail to or do not make such 
provision would they be considered an unfavorable condition in the 
foreign trade of the US. Of course,, what constitutes "equal access to 
such cargo" is left to the FMC to define. In the present, 
cronically-overtonnaged market a mathematically exact equal access 
could result in no liner operator having a large enough load to 
economically justify his voyage. It should be highlighted that this 
section of the Act has been given renewed vigor and applied to the 
cargo reservation schemes of the Philippines and Venezuela, and the 
FMC is currently studying cross-trader access to the trades between 
the US, and Argentina and Brazil. 
The second area of interest is at 46 CFR 585.3 (d), and relates 
to conditions which 
"Are discriminatory or unfair as between carriers, shippers, 
exporters, importers, or ports or between exporters from the 
United States and their foreign competitors and which cannot 
be justified under generally-accepted international agreements 
or practices and which operate to the detriment of the foreign 
commerce or the public interest of the United States." 
This subparagraph would seem to indicate that discriminatory 
conditions are justified or accepted if they are carried out persuant 
to a generally-accepted international agreement. In this context, the 
United Nations Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences 
entered into force on 6 October 1983 and would, therefore, seem to be 
a generally-accepted international agreement. Due to the well-known 
position of the US Government against the Code of Conduct„ it might be 
pertinent to question if this clause permits liner conferences to 
apportion cargoes among their members in US-foreign trades? 
2. Liner shipping within the European Communities Treaty of Rome. 
For many years the principal focus of transport activities of the 
Commission of the European Communities was related to road„ rail and 
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waterway cargo movements between member countries. At that time, 
maritime transport was considered to be a national matter governed by 
member states' laws, conference agreements and the market. However, 
in response to numerous factors such as non-commercial competition, 
overtonnaging, national cargo reservation regimes and the United 
Nations Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences, various 
member states adopted the Code of Conduct together with their own 
Brussels Package and this became the first pronouncement of a shipping 
policy for the European Economic Community (EEC). 
Current efforts to include shipping within paragragh 2 of article 
84 of the Treaties Establishing the European Communities, better known 
as the Treaty of Rome, are a partial response to the above factors as 
well as an expression of EEC support for the US Shipping Act of 1984. 
The proposals currently being considered by the Commission and member 
countries as elements of a common shipping policy are; (1) diplomatic 
action and countermeasures against third countries protecting their 
fleets by reservation or bilateral arrangements, (2) freedom to 
provide shipping services by all EEC nationals, with a transition 
period of five years for international trades and 10 years for 
cabotage, (3) consultation procedures between EEC members and third 
countries, (4) criteria for defining a national shipping line within 
the Code of Conduct, (5) application of the Rules on Competition, 
found at articles 85-90 of the Treaty of Rome, to shipping in order to 
counter various practices defined as unfair, and (6) fines against 
shipowners who charge unfair prices in EEC liner trades. As there is 
no agreement on the structure and application of the latter two 
proposals, they have been temporarily set aside by the Council of 
Ministers. Of the remaining four proposals, there is. complete 
agreement except for freedom to engage in cabotage by all EEC 
nationals. 
An EEC common shipping policy has numerous facets, but the major 
impact for Latin America and the Caribbean would be its position on 
cargo reservation regimes. By means of the Code of Conduct and the 
Brussels Package the EEC has recognized the right of all countries to 
divide trade shares, as well as for regions to reserve certain aspects 
of their trade relations for themselves. Of the above proposals, the 
first contains measures which might be used against cargo reservation, 
but many EEC member countries have such regimes. As example, France 
reserves the import of oil from Algeria for national vessels, Spain 
reserves its trade with the Canary Islands for national vessels, 
Greece reserves its island trade for national vessels, and other EEC 
members, while not having a formal cabotage regimes, implicitly limit 
access to domestic cargo movements. So important are these cargo 
reservation schemes that they have become the major obstacle to the 
adoption of a common EEC policy for shipping. As a result, it appears 
that cabotage will be eliminated from the proposed common policy so 
that member states may approve the remaining posposals by the end of 
1986. 
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3- Lome III. Beginning in 1964 the EEC has governed its trade 
development and investment relations with former dependent overseas 
countries and territories by means of conventions which are negotiated 
every five years. With the addition of new member states to the EEC, 
the number of former dependent overseas countries and territories 
becoming contracting parties to each successive convention has 
continually increased. For example, during negotiations between the 
EEC and the United Kingdom for its own entrance into the EEC, 
Mauritius asked to accede to the trade convention in force at that 
time and was permitted to do so on 30 June 1973. Other countries 
wishing to accede to the convention led to the adoption of Protocol 
22, annexed to the Acts of Accession to the EEC of the United Kingdom, 
whereby the EEC offered to 21 Commonwealth countries of Africa, the 
Caribbean and Pacific an opportunity to negotiate their future 
relations within the framework of this trade and investment 
convention. 
The fifth trade and investment convention, known as Lomé III, was 
signed between 65 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states and the 
EEC on 8 December 1984. The financial package of this Convention 
totals 7 400 million European Currency Units (1 ECU = US$ 1.02) and 
provides ACP states access to EEC markets for products such as 
bananas, rum, sugar, etc., and sources of financial and technical 
assistance for projects and programmes in areas which range from trade 
promotion to transport and from environment to industry. 
The accession of Mauritius to the EEC-ACP Lomé Convention 
framework at its own request and the continued expansion of the number 
of eligible ACP states indicate a most flexible attitude of 
contracting parties. With the entry of Portugal and Spain into the 
EEC on 1 January 1986 a number of questions arise concerning the 
desirability of a protocol, similar to number 22 mentioned above, 
which would permit Latin American countries to accede to Lomé III. 
For example, Article 252 of Chapter 3, entitled "Provisions relating 
to establishment and services", requires reciprocal, 
non-discriminatory treatment of national firms by all contracting 
parties. With reference to transport. Article 88 provides that 
"The Contracting Parties agree that competitive access to the 
trade shall not be impaired." 
Thus, the questions are: Should Latin American countries seek to 
become contracting parties to Lomé III? If yes, what would be its 
impact on trade and transport? 
4• Note 1 to Annex A of the Code of Liberalisation of Current In-
visible Operations (CLIO). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) was established by a Convention signed at 
Paris, France, on 14 December 1960, and currently has 24 
market-economy developed nations as members -Australia, Canada, 19 
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European nations, Japan, New Zealand and the US. This Convention 
provides that the OECD shall promote various economic growth and trade 
expansion policies, and in order to achieve these policies its members 
agree 
"to pursue their efforts to reduce or abolish obstacles to the 
exchange of goods and services and current payments and 
maintain and extend the liberalisation of capital movements." 
(emphasis added). 
To carry out the above agreement as related to shipping services, 
member countries negotiated and adopted Note 1 to Annex A of CLIO. 
Transport services within the scope of CLIO are enumerated at part C 
to Annex A, while Note 1 provides guidelines for the liberalization of 
all international maritime transport services and related freight 
charges. Note 1 contains only three sentences, but they have a large 
potential impact on the US initiative to include all services, which 
includes maritime transport, within the framework of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The first sentence provides 
that residents of one OECD state have an unrestricted opportunity to 
avail themselves of the international maritime transport services 
offered by residents of another OECD state. This is followed by a 
requirement that international maritime transport services "should" 
not be hampered by measures such as exchange controls, preferential 
flag treatement or clauses in trade agreements, to ensure that normal 
commercial considerations "should" alone determine the method and flag 
of shipment. Finally, the third sentence provides that 
"The second sentence of this Note does not apply to the United 
States." 
Even though the second sentence uses the word "should", thereby 
indicating that its provisions constitute a suggestion and compliance 
is discretionary, the US Government clearly indicates from the third 
sentence that it does not wish to liberalize international maritime 
transport services. If this interpretation is correct, then why is 
the US Government seeking to have all services, which includes 
international maritime transport, placed in a GATT framework? Would 
the US Government permit the national defense aspects of its maritime 
policy to be subject to GATT requirements of non-discrimination 
against liner services of other countries in areas such as right of 
establishment, access to markets and commercial presence, as well as 
dispute settlement, most-favored-nation treatment and transparency of 
subsidies? It would appear that the US Government either has changed 
its position since Note 1 to Annex A of CLIO was adopted or has not 
considered the implications of such liberalization for its maritime 
transport policy. 
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5. US/Consultive Shipping Group (US/CSG). It will he remembered 
that the US Shipping Act of 1916 gave liner operators complete 
immunity from antitrust laws of that country for any activity covered 
by an agreement on file and in effect at the FMC. However, a series 
of US court decision in the 1950s and 1960s eroded that immunity. 
Liner operators in Europe and the US became increasingly uncertain as 
to whether an agreement on file with the FMC was sufficient to protect 
them from an antitrust violation» The US/CSG discussions were an 
outgrowth of the uncertainity surrounding antitrust immunity of the 
Act of 1916. In recognition of the need to clarify this situation, an 
important feature of the Shipping Act of 1984 was to explicitly 
indicate that antitrust immunity includes not only those activities in 
agreements on file with the FMC but also for those entered into 
pursuant to such agreements. 
The CSG members include Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, the 
Federal Republic of Germany^ Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Participating at meetings are 
representatives of those countries, as well as representatives from 
the EEC and the US. As a result of the positive US/CSG contribution 
to the harmonization of European and US ocean-liner policies for 
antitrust immunity, discussion have continued to be held to ensure 
that other elements of such policies are compatible. The current 
focus of US/CSG discussion is related to policies which safeguard and 
promote competition in all sectors of ocean shipping. At the last 
meeting of the US/CSG, held at Copenhagen, Denmark, 28-30 April 1986, 
a joint statement of their conclusions was prepared. The three 
operative paragraphs of that statement indicate 
"1. They will seek to maximise the amount of cargo subject to 
competitive access. 
2. Whether or not the UN Liner Code applies to their trades, 
the participants reaffirm their resolve to avoid the intro-
duction of new governmental measures, and to resist measures 
introduced or encouraged by third countries, where their effect 
is to exclude or restrict competitive access by each others' 
shipping lines to cargoes in their trades. The participants will 
maintain the right of commercially operated non-conference lines 
to compete freely for liner cargoes. 
3. The participants have agreed that they should continue to 
consult regularly and, where appropriate, to coordinate actions 
relating to their shipping policies. In particular, they intend 
to consult on: 
(i) the means jointly to resist harmful protectionist actions; 
(ii) the means to improve competitive conditions in shipping; 
(iii) the means to overcome restrictive commercial practices 
that have the effect of substantially restricting or closing 
trades, especially those practices that give effect to restric-
tive shipping policies of third countries; 
(.iv) each others' regulatory practices? and 
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(v) the future direction of the consultations." 
While some of the wording of the above three paragraphs is in 
general terms, the statement demonstrates a clear and joint intention 
to resist protectionism in ocean-liner shipping by ensuring 
competitive access of their conference and non-conference liner 
operators to the cargoes generated by third countries. This can be 
regarded as an indication of a possible US/CSG position at the 1988 
review of the Code of Conduct regarding the extension of its scope to 
include non-conference operators. In the light of US/CSG activities 
to co-ordinate their shipping policies to achieve common goals, one 
might ask if should Latin American and Caribbean countries should do 
the same to preserve their own national shipping policies? 
B. Measures adopted jointly by developed and developing countries 
The major legislative efforts of developed and developing 
countries encompass four conventions negotiated under the auspices of 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) -a 
Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences, the International Multimodal 
Transport of Goods, the Carriage of Goods by Sea (the Hamburg Rules) 
and the Conditions for Registration of Vessels, as well as the 
discussions currently taking place at GATT concerning the inclusion of 
services within its framework. In the light of the market, service, 
technological and legal forces which are restructuring ocean-liner 
transport three areas are of fundamental importance; that is, (1) 
liability regimes for the carriage of containers, (2) possible topics 
for the 1988 review conference for the Code of Conduct and (3) the 
initiative to include services within the GATT framework. 
1. Liability regimes for the carriage of containers. From the 
earliest days of steam to about 1970 general cargo ships were the 
supreme workhorses of ocean-liner transport. Until the International 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to 
Bills of Lading, also known as the Hague Rules, were adopted in 1924, 
existing legal regimes permitted almost unlimited freedom of contract 
and ship operators were virtually divesting themselves of any 
liability for cargo loss or damage, however caused, by means of 
exemption clauses in their bills of lading. However, the Hague Rules 
circumscribed such freedom by defining, among others, the standards of 
care for cargoes and the period of responsibility for operators of 
general cargo vessels. Such responsibility is from "hook-to-hook", or 
from the time individual cargo units were attached to the hook of a 
vessel's crane at the port of loading until they were released from 
the hook at the port of discharge. Within this responsibility regime 
at paragraph 2 of article III carriers are required to 
"... properly and carefully load, handle, stow, carry, keep, 
care for, and discharge the goods carried." 
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From the time goods are attached to the ship's hook until they 
are released therefrom, ocean-liner companies are required to exercise 
due diligence to preserve the cargo. The ship must be in proper 
condition to receive the cargo, and the cargo must be loaded with care 
as well as correctly stowed, lashed and well secured for the intended 
voyage. With the changes brought about by unit-load systems one might 
ask, are these requirements applicable to containers where such units 
are stuffed and stripped at interior cargo terminals or at factories? 
Should operators of cellular vessels be required to assume such 
responsibility when they are no longer involved in the handling and 
stowage of the goods carried? 
The Hamburg Rules were elaborated to bring the Hague Rules 
up-to-date and were adopted on 30 March 1978, but have not, as yet, 
entered into force. At article 4 the "hook-to-hook" period of 
responsibility for vessel operators is extended to cover the period 
during which such operators are in charge of the goods at the ports of 
loading and discharge. This extension recognizes that shipping lines 
have progressively begun to look inland and engage in activities both 
before and after the "hook", but it should be questioned whether it 
provides sufficient flexibility to recognize the growing role of 
shippers, consignees and their agents in cargo handling.and storage 
activities, as well as filling and emptying of containers? 
At article 5 of the Hamburg Rules the standards of care for 
cargoes is based on liability for fault. Paragraph 1 of article 5 
provides that 
"The carrier is liable for loss resulting from loss of or damage 
to the goods, as well as from delay in delivery, if the 
occurrence which caused the loss, damage or delay took place 
while the goods were in his charge as defined in article 4, 
unless the carrier proves that he, his servants or agents took 
all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the 
occurrence and its consequences." 
The commercial practice of loading and sealing containers at factories 
and interior cargo terminals, as well as the speed with which 
containers ships are loaded and discharged, effectively precludes 
operators of such ships from inspecting cargoes before accepting them 
for carriage. If cargoes are found damaged upon opening containers, 
to exculpate themselves vessel operators must establish where the 
damage occured and who is responsible or compensate the injured party. 
With the possible spin-off or separation of containers from 
ocean-liner transport and their carriage by contractual or charter 
arrangements, one might ask if the absence of specific legislation 
portends a return to freedom of contract based upon the negotiating 
strength of each party. The second sentence of article V of the Hague 
Rules and the cases decided thereon have been embodied in paragraph 3 
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of article 2 of the Hamburg Rules. The latter provides a partial 
answer by indicating that 
"The provisions of this Convention are not applicable to 
charter-parties. However, where a bill of lading is issued 
pursuant to a charter-party, the provisions of the Convention 
apply to such a bill of lading if it governs the relation 
between the carrier and the holder of the bill of lading, 
not being the charterer." 
It would appear, therefore, that there might be a change of direction 
towards freedom of contract between shippers and carriers for 
containers transported under charter arrangements. While there are no 
conventions which specifically cover this matter, there are numerous 
sources of experience which could be utilized by the ocean-liner 
industry to define the extent of such freedom. For example, 
charter-parties for the carriage of traditional bulk cargoes, related 
industry practices and guidelines laid down by courts in resolving 
disputes, as well as the requirements promulgated by the FMC for 
service contracts filed with it pursuant to the US Shipping Act of 
1984, might all provide some orientation for the negotiation of 
charter arrangements for the carriage of containers. Nonetheless, 
where and when these practices and guidelines for bulk cargoes, and 
the requirements for service contracts in US-foreign trades might be 
employed for containers will await a decision of the market place. 
2. Possible topics at the 1988 review conference on the Code of 
Conduct for Liner Conferences. Preliminary negotiation on various 
aspects of a code of conduct for liner conferences began as early as 
1967. Such negotiations later were centered at UNCTAD and by 1974 
resulted in the approval of the Convention on a Code of Conduct for 
Liner Conferences. To have a better understanding of the Code of 
Conduct one must take into account the ocean-liner environment which 
existed between 1967 and 1974, and the mandatory form in which it was 
elaborated. 
With reference to the ocean-liner environment between 1967-1974, 
it will be remembered that the first international movement of 
containers occured in 1966 and was a trans-Atlantic voyage between the 
US and Germany. By 1967 there were no more than five container 
vessels trading internationally, and by 1974 that number probably 
increased to approximately 25. In other words, the container 
revolution was at its earliest stages and general cargo conferences 
controlled ocean-liner shipping. With reference to the diagram at 
part II.B., during the period 1967-1974 the evolution of liner 
conferences had reached the stage of breakbulk agreements. The Code 
was elaborated prior to the structural changes brought about by 
containerization and, of course, prior to the market, service, 
technological and legal forces which are currently restructuring the 
industry. This is not to indicate that the Code is not a useful 
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instrument, but merely that it, like many other legal regimes, has 
been largely overtaken by changes in the industry it seeks to 
regulate. Thus, the questions facing all contracting parties are: 
What changes are needed to bring the Code up-to-date and how can those 
changes as well as the Code be structured to ensure that it will not 
be rapidly overtaken again by future events? 
In this context, it is considered that some of the areas which 
might be discussed at the 1988 Code review conference could include 
individual proposals by developed and developing countries, as well as 
those made jointly. With reference to the first, developed countries 
might propose (a) the elimination of article 2 -participation in a 
trade, and (b) the right of economic communities to become contracting 
parties to the Code. On the other hand, some of the areas which might 
be proposed by developing countries could include (a) the allocation 
of cargo shares by governments rather than conferences, (b) the 
inclusion of outsiders or non-conference lines within the scope of the 
Code, (c) a definition of the role of load-center ports, 
intermodal-landbridge services, large-scale vessels and their relation 
to the fleets of developing countries. Both groups of countries might 
make proposals related to (a) the separation of containers from other 
liner cargoes and their transport by chartered vessels, (b). the broker 
activities of conferences, (c) uniform interpretation of the Code, and 
(d) changes to the structure of the Code which might permit easier and 
more frequent modifications. 
3. The initiative to include services within the GATT framework. 
In response to section 102(g) of the 1974 US Trade Act, which defines 
international trade as including commercial exchanges of both goods 
and services, the US Government at the Tokyo Round of trade 
negotiations proposed the inclusion of services. No major concessions 
were granted on this proposal, as the US and its main trade partners 
were preoccupied with other issues. However, at the November 1982 
GATT Ministerial Session, the US sought to establish a work programme 
on services in GATT. Strong resistance by developing and certain 
developed nations led to a Ministerial Declaration which recommended 
that GATT contracting parties undertake national studies on services 
and suggested that they exchange relevant information through 
international organizations such as GATT. 
The strong resistance by developing countries to the 
establishment of a work programme on services in GATT is based on a 
belief that the structure of GATT is inappropriate for negotiations on 
services, that it lacks experience as well as jurisdiction in those 
matters and that the specter of trade retaliation -one country or 
group of countries restricting the admission of certain goods because 
other(s) have done the same for its goods- could be expanded to 
cross-sectorial or goods-services retaliations. With reference to the 
latter, the US Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 specifically provides for 
cross-sectorial retaliation; that is, if a country wishes to reserve 
a specific service area for its citizens, other countries may 
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retaliate in the form of restrictions against its trade in goods. In 
the light of these considerations, since the Ministerial Declaration 
of 1982 service negotiations have not been held within the framework 
of the GATT agreement, but rather at GATT Headquarters utilizing its 
conference facilities through what is now called the "Jaramillo Track" 
for the Colombian Ambassador at Geneva, Switzerland, Felipe Jaramillo, 
who is also chairman of the GATT committee on services. 
The proposal to include services within GATT starts from an 
assumption that all services are basically alike and can be treated 
the same. Services have historically been separated into factor or 
those requiring an investment, non-factor, public, private, producer 
or those which add value to a product, consumer, etc., but these 
classifications merely provide a discription of the common 
characteristics of each group of services. While many services do 
have certain characteristics in common, such as an inability to be 
stored for future use, the differences between them come not from such 
characteristics nor activities carried out by each but from government 
policies which determine their individual structures. For example, as 
was discussed at part IV, the structure of ocean-liner transport is 
largely determined not by the commercial aspects of such services, 
which is roughly equivalent to a functional discription of that 
activity, but rather from considerations related to economic security 
and national defense. Unless and until the government policy issues 
surrounding each service are analyzed, the true nature of services and 
their relevance in the national development process will not be fully 
understood. 
It is most difficult to liberalize trade in services by. treating 
them all the same or even by grouping them into classes according to 
functions, activities or characteristics. A more complete 
understanding of services might be obtained through the preparation of 
analyses of government policies which determine the individual 
structure of each service. This would be a complex undertaking, but 
without such analyses negotiations on the "Jaramillo Track" face the 
very real risk of entering a no-man's land of non-issues, non-papers 
and non-binding agreements. As an example of the need to analyze 
government policy issues which determine the structure of a specific 
service, the US initiative to include all services within GATT is 
difficult to reconcile with its rejection of the second sentence of 
Note 1 to Annex A of CLIO. Indeed, the US position regarding Note 1, 
as presented at part IV.A.4., could well be an expression of economic 
security and national defense considerations which will not permit its 
liner shipping to be subject to GATT requirements. Once the structure 
of each service has been determined, negotiations on the "Jaramillo 
Track" can be directed toward those where an agreement would be 
beneficial for all. 
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C. Measures adopted individually by Latin American and Caribbean 
countries 
The legislative efforts of Latin American and Caribbean countries 
include the adoption of cargo reservation regimes, establishment of 
state owned shipping lines, creation of maritime transport fora to 
facilitate regional collaboration, and participation in regional 
multinational shipping lines. While each of these efforts is 
important, only that related to cargo reservation regimes will be 
treated in this document. Nonetheless, the establishment of two 
regional fora and three multinational shipping lines clearly indicate 
the willingness of Latin American and Caribbean countries to 
collaborate in matters related to ocean-liner transport. For 
instance, the West Indies Shipping Corporation (WISCO) was established 
in 1961 by 12 Caribbean countries and presently operates four cellular 
vessels which are largely dedicated to the requirements of owner 
countries -three in short-sea services between the Caribbean islands 
and the US east coast, and the other on a Caribbean inter-island 
route. 
The majority of merchant fleets of this region were established 
on the basis of the continued supremacy of two important pillars; 
that is, cargo reservation regimes and the liner conference system. 
The impact of market, service, technological and legal forces on the 
liner conference structure was treated at parts II.A., and B., and 
IV.A.1. b), and the results of those same forces on cargo reservation 
regimes will be treated in this part. It should be highlighted that 
the fundamental question treated in this part is not whether cargo 
reservation regimes have assisted in the establishment and . operation 
of such fleets, as they most certainly have, but whether the present 
structure of such regimes is appropriate in the light of changes which 
have taken place and are occuring in the industry. 
It will be recalled that most cargo reservation regimes were 
prepared and adopted in the years between the end of the Second World 
War and the start of the container revolution, and reflect the era of 
general cargo vessels and labor intensive port operations. Since that 
time the characteristics of ocean-liner transport have ineluctably 
changed. For example, Latin American and Caribbean fleets have 
changed to multi-purpose and cellular vessels which permit the 
carriage of a wide range of cargoes as well as containers. Not only 
have the characteristics of such fleets changed but also there have 
been changes from modal to intermodal and multimodal transport systems 
and the ocean-liner industry has entered an age of system 
optimization, cronic overtonnaging, scale-economy services, contract 
carriage of homogenous cargoes and fungible transport services. 
1. The impact of market and service forces on cargo reservation 
regimes. In Latin American and Caribbean trades the spin-off or 
separation of containers from ocean-liner transport and their carriage 
under contract arrangements will depend on the volume and balance of 
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containers in movement, and the frequency of service required by 
shippers and consignees. Currently, these factors weigh heavily 
against a separation of containers from ocean-liner transport 
services. Nonetheless, the trade flows of this region have only begun 
to be containerized and as this process advances the basis for such 
separation should be created. For example, it has been estimated that 
by the end of this century the amount of cargoes carried in containers 
for Latin American and Caribbean countries will increase by 31 per 
cent. As both international trade and liner transport are dynamic and 
permanently evolving fields, a spin-off of containers in high-volume 
Latin American and Caribbean trades could occur within the next 
decade. Thus, it would appear that sufficient time exists within 
which present transport equipment might be amortized and appropriate 
plans made to participate in the remaining liner services as well as 
in the contract carriage arrangements for containers. 
With reference to the plans for future participation in liner and 
contractual carriage arrangements, it is most important to consider 
what impact such separation might have on the cargo base to which 
reservation regimes are applicable. It might be thought that after 
the spin-off of containers in a specific trade route they will be 
treated as any other bulk cargo, but this probably will not be the 
case. Even after containers are spun-off from ocean-liner services, 
they will retain many of the characteristics of liner cargoes -such as 
the continuity of flows and frequency requirements of shippers and 
consignees. These common characteristics will probably preclude their 
treatment as either liner or bulk cargoes. As containers transported 
under contractual arrangements would have characteristics of both 
liner and bulk trades, their spin-off might lead to a reclassification 
of cargoes subject to cargo reservation regimes. Such 
reclassification might involve a change from the traditional bulk and 
liner categories to bulk, liner and those which are carried under 
contractual arrangements in liner trades or quasi-liner cargoes. 
Thus, the current structure of cargo reservation regimes for bulk and 
liner cargoes might be restrictive if a separation occurs and future 
efforts might be made to determine if a third category is needed for 
quasi-liner cargoes. 
As containers will share both bulk and liner cargo 
characteristics, liner operators of this region could be caught in a 
vicious circle; that is, to engage in the contract carriage of 
containers a sufficient volume and balance is needed to meet cargo 
owners' frequency requirements. Without such volume and balance 
containers must be transported on traditional liner vessels, which 
after the spin-off will be much more expensive than their contractual 
counterparts. The higher cost of liner carriage for containers could 
reduce the volume even further and increase cargo owners' efforts to 
utilize contractual arrangements for the carriage of their containers. 
To break this vicious circle, Latin American and Caribbean countries 
with similar trade patterns might join their individual cargo bases. 
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The efforts of cargo owners to utilize contractual arrangements 
for the carriage of containers might take many forms. For example, it 
could begin with requests for lowering transport costs through the use 
of contract carriers in trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific trades, while 
liner operators from this region would act as long-distance feeders 
between ports of this region and those of North America. The second 
step might be the formation of large international consortia in which 
the liner companies of this region would have either active 
(operational) or passive (shareholding) minority roles. Finally, as 
minority participants in international consortia, countries of this 
region would face the risk of having a merchant fleet which might lack 
the flexibility to respond to national interests. 
2. The impact of service and technology forces on cargo reserva-
tion regimes. It might be considered that the availability of 
financing is the fundamental factor which limits the incorporation of 
new technologies such as reduced-crew cellular vessels and 48' 
containers into Latin American and Caribbean fleets. While funding is 
important, the acquisition of new technologies by ocean-liner 
companies of the region fundamentally depends upon the types and 
volumes of cargoes in movement, the locations of cargo origins and 
destinations, the need for a smooth interface with other systems and 
the evolution of trade flows. Currently, the availability of 
financing weighs against the incorporation of such technologies, but 
the wide range of liner cargoes -containers, refrigerated, odd-sized 
units, automobiles, steel, etc.- presented for transport and reduced 
volumes limit the possibility for intensive use of specialized vessels 
and equipment. If the amount of cargo carried in containers increases 
31 per cent, as was indicated in part IV.C.l., a base might be created 
for the utilization of such technologies. However, the inland 
technology requirements for Europe and North America are not only 
different but also in early stages of evolution, as was presented at 
part III.C.2., and each must be studied carefully to ensure the 
technology selected might have a long-term harmonious interface in 
those regions as well as in Latin America. 
In addition to financing, cargo and interface problems, the major 
impact on cargo reservation regimes might come from the demonstration 
effect of a systems approach to the movement of goods through 
intermodalism, harmonized inland transport services, load centering, 
new technologies, facilitation of trade documentation and procedures, 
etc., by liner operators of developed countries which participate in 
Latin American and Caribbean trades. This could result in strong 
efforts by shippers and consignees of the region to limit the scope of 
application of cargo reservation regimes to traditional bulk and 
non-homogenous, non-containerizable liner cargoes, thereby permitting 
quasi-liner cargoes to be transported by contract carriers. With the 
possible spin-off or separation of containers from liner shipping and 
the attendant lowering of rates through contract carriage 
arrangements, shippers and consignees might allege the loss of market 
shares through what are viewed as excessive transport costs. 
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3. The impact of legal forces on cargo reservation regimes. 
While not generally recognized, ocean-liner transport is an industry 
of shared sovereignty; that is, the ocean transport of goods between 
two or more countries requires compliance with the legal regimes of 
each. Liner operators seek to comply with the laws of each country 
they serve, but at times there are differences between the 
requirements of such laws. For instance, a bilateral trade agreement 
between two countries, which permits only the vessels of those nations 
to participate, might be at variance with the laws of another country 
whose vessels seek access to that trade. This variance is academic 
unless the latter country is a principal trading partner of the other 
two and can take retaliatory measures such as changing to other 
sources for the same goods or closing its ports to their vessels. 
Thus, an understanding of the relation between national ocean-liner 
regimes is of fundamental importance to shipping lines and, as a 
result, must be given careful and continuous study. 
Of all the legal measures that are currently being applied to or 
elaborated for the ocean-liner industry, possibly those which might 
have the greatest impact on Latin American and Caribbean countries are 
related to the initiatives of the EEC and US as well as their common 
efforts at the GATT and at the US/CSG meetings. While each, of these 
initiatives were discussed individually at parts IV.A.1., IV.A.2., and 
IV.A.5., it is important to consider their possible impact on the 
cargo reservation regimes of Latin American and Caribbean countries. 
An assessment of the exact impact of such initiatives is impossible, 
as each case will be determined by differing criteria of the relevant 
national authorities, but certain scenes can be suggested. First, 
section 13(b)(5) of the Shipping Act of 19S4 and 19 of the Merchant 
Marine Act of 1920 clearly permit the FMC to bring actions against 
cargo reservation regimes. However, no such actions will be brought 
in the case of the former unless a US flag vessel is commercially able 
to enter the trade in question, while the latter will not be utilized 
unless a shipping line is denied the right to participate on an equal 
basis in the desired trade. 
The second scene involves a backing away from the written law 
pursuant to the role the US Government sees for maritime transport in 
its overall commercial, economic and defense policy. As was discussed 
at part IV.A.1. a), section 13(b)(6) of the Shipping Act of 1984 
limits the application of 13(b)(5) to presidential review. Moreover, 
the importance of shipping within that overall policy must be 
understood. An indication of the different roles maritime transport 
should play within such policy can be seen from the US initiative to 
liberalize international trade in services by including all services 
within the GATT framework, while at the same time denying the 
liberalization of shipping services within Note 1 to Annex A of CLIO. 
This conflict in the US position on liberalization of shipping 
services leads one to believe that shipping is accorded a secondary 
role in the formulation of national commercial, economic and defense 
policies and that the application of section 13(b)(5) of the Shipping 
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Act of 1984 and section 19 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 would be 
accorded a similar position. While these sections might be accorded a 
secondary role in US national policies, it does not mean they can be 
ignored. What it means is that when the effects of cargo reservation 
regimes begin to have an impact on primary policy considerations in 
the US, the probability of their being utilized increases enormously. 
The third scene involves the application of the above sections 
against Latin American and Caribbean cargo reservation regimes. The 
impact of such application will depend upon two factors; first, 
whether the countries of this region unite to present a common 
position; and second, whether that position is presented at the 
diplomatic and/or legal levels. Of course, the circumstances of each 
particular case will govern such choices, but it can be advanced that 
a united region acting on both diplomatic and legal levels might 
provide the greatest opportunity for success. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
At the introduction to this document it was brought out that the 
forces which are restructuring ocean-liner transport are neither 
isolated nor unrelated and together constitute a discernible pattern 
which must be understood for survival. In this context, the major 
service, market, technological and legal forces changing the industry 
have been evaluated and seem to indicate that containers will probably 
be spun-off or separated from ocean-liner transport in high-volume 
routes and carried under contractual or charter arrangements. The 
growing role of non-conference carriers and the attendant weakening of 
the conference system are the result of the homogenous nature of 
containers and the fungible or identical ocean-liner transport 
systems. Supporting these market and service forces are 
intermodal-landbridge transport systems, load-centering at a reduced 
number of ports, large-scale vessels and legal regimes which provide 
carriers with the rights of independent action on rates and of 
entering into service contracts with shippers. 
In an era of structural change for the ocean-liner industry ship 
operators have become accustomed to living with a high degree of 
uncertainity and making decisions with only few of the relevant facts. 
This document has sought to assist such decision making by means of an 
overview of the forces which are changing the industry, and to provide 
Latin American and Caribbean countries with information which they 
might utilize to commence preparations for the ocean-liner environment 
of the future. While there are many areas which should be given 
additional study, countries of this region might wish to consider (a) 
an international convention for overtonnaging, (b) the repetition and 
direction aspects of ocean-liner shipping, (c) a change from 
traditional liner operators to trade route specialists and (d) the 
elaboration of a common operational and institutional liner policy 
which responds to the structural changes. 
A. An international convention for overtonnacring 
In order to create a basis which might permit all relevant 
persons to collaborate in the development of measures to deal with 
overtonnaging, it is considered that international action might be 
appropriate. This could result in the preparation of either a 
mandatory or working type of convention. To elaborate a mandatory 
convention there are three requirement? that is, there must be (1) an 
agreement among possible contracting parties that an international 
convention is required to treat a specific problem, (2) an agreement 
among such parties concerning the contents of the clauses which will 
treat the problem and (3) the problem area treated must be relatively 
stable. Where each of these requirements is satisfied, the use of a 
mandatory convention would be indicated. An example of a mandatory 
convention fulfilling these requirements would be the Hague Rules, 
which has been in force since 1924. However, where these conditions 
are not satisfied, a working convention may be elaborated if there is 
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agreement only in the first area, and the matter or problem treated is 
in a constant state of evolution. In this latter situation, one might 
utilize a working type of agreement which is commonly employed in 
facilitation conventions such as the International Convention on the 
simplification and harmonization of Customs procedures, commonly 
refered to as the Kyoto Convention, and others. 
The interests of governments, shipbuilders, ship operators, banks 
insurance companies, classification societies, shippers and consigees 
appear too divergent to formulate a mandatory convention. 
Nonetheless, as all of the above parties recognize the continuing 
dangers of overtonnaging, it might be useful to consider the adoption 
of a working type of convention. A working convention could establish 
a forum in which all contracting parties would meet to develop 
measures that respond to specific terms of reference and treat the 
agreed problems. For example, the forum might have two levels 
-governmental and technical- with annual meetings for the first, while 
the latter could meet more frequently. The areas treated by technical 
working groups would be determined by the convention's terms of 
reference, but they might range from limits on the availability of 
public and private sector financing for new vessels to incentives for 
scrapping of redundant tonnage, and from the strengthening of the 
relation between classification societies and insurance companies to 
the reduction of shipbuilding capacity. 
At the meetings of technical working groups, participants would 
study and make proposals in three areas; that is, measures, 
recommended practices and general customs. It should be highlighted 
that measures could be mandatory if approved at the government level, 
while recommended practices might become measures within an agreed 
period of time and general customs might become recommended practices 
only through further action of the contracting parties. The inherent 
flexibility of measures, practices and customs would permit 
contracting parties to adopt proposals at the custom level to verify 
its usefulness. Once verified the custom might be proposed for 
upgrading to a recommended practice or sent back to the technical 
level for further study. If proposed measures, practices and customs 
are approved by, for instance, two-thirds of the contracting parties 
present and voting, they would be incorporated into the convention at 
their respective levels. Likewise, a similar procedure can be 
utilized for their removal. 
B. The repetition and direction aspects of ocean-liner shipping-
Commonly ocean-liner transport is defined by its physical 
elements such as vessels, containers, fork-lift trucks, gantry cranes, 
ports and many others. Everyone is aware of these elements and the 
activities carried out by each, but it is seldom recognized that such 
activities make liner transport a repetition industry; that is, 
day-in and day-out the same cargoes are loaded and discharged, the 
same vessels enter and depart the same ports, the same trade and 
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transport documentation is prepared, the same Customs formalities are 
complied with, etc. This repetition leads one to believe that the 
physical elements and daily activities define the totality of 
ocean-liner transport, but nothing could be further from the truth. 
While important, the physical elements and repetitive activities are 
merely a small part of the industry. 
Upon critical examination, it can be seen that liner transport is 
much more than physical elements and operational activities. To see 
beyond these aspects it is necessary to separate the repetition and 
direction functions of shipping enterprises. There are many elements 
in common, but the first largely involves the daily operational 
activities, while the second requires an ongoing evaluation of the 
market, service, technological and legal forces which create an 
environment of constant change and permanent evolution for the 
industry. To see behind the cotidian mask of repetitive activities, 
one must look beyond the reactive or operational atmosphere of today 
and towards those elements which will assist in carrying out the 
policy and planning requirements of tomorrow. The stimulus of change 
which results from such forward looking evaluation should not be 
underestimated, as it can permit ship operators to develop an indepth 
understanding or strategic vision of the industry and anticipate as 
well as utilize the future. 
C. A chancre from traditional liner operators to trade route 
specialists 
Traditional liner operators are experts in moving cargo between 
ports. When the costs of moving goods between ports is compared with 
that between origin and destination, it can be seen that the largest 
amount of revenue comes from shoreside activities. For example, Cast 
North America operates a two port system between Montreal and Antwerp, 
with an integrated inland transport system, and estimates that only 10 
per cent of its costs are involved in ocean carriage. Similarly, 
Sea-Land indicates ocean transport costs are approximately 25-30 per 
cent, while Atlantic Container Line considers they reach 30 per cent. 
Thus, between 70-90 per cent of all income is generated from inland 
transport, cargo handling, storage and other related services, and 
liner operators of this region might wish to consider the advantages 
of becoming trade route specialists (TRS). 
A TRS utilizes a systems approach to the entire distribution 
chain and seeks to harmonize all activities in the movement of goods 
from origin to destination. During such movements TRSs either provide 
or form joint ventures to provide whatever services are needed, 
whether they might be ocean carriage, terminal operation, land 
transport, storage, packing, etc. While success of traditional 
operators is largely based on time and place utility, economies of 
scale and price, TRSs enjoy wider parameters which range from shipper 
and consignee involvement in the design of vessels and in the 
selection of route structures to purchasing and inventory control 
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advisory services for cargo owners. The purchase of a vessel or cargo 
handling equipment by a traditional operator is an investment in 
transport, whereas a similar purchase by a TRS is an investment in the 
productive processes of a trade route. The demand for the services of 
traditional operators is largely determined by the terms of trade (FOB 
or CIF) and other requirements, while for TRSs these aspects become 
less relevant as goods are carried under contract from producers to 
consumers. 
D. A common liner policy for Latin American and Caribbean coun-
tries 
Survival of liner operators requires knowledge, skills and 
understandings beyond the technicalities of vessel operations. The 
major challenge facing Latin American and Caribbean countries in this 
time of structural change is related to the establishment of a common 
policy which might co-ordinate their ocean-liner activities. As was 
presented at part IV., the three principle elements of a liner 
shipping policy are commercial, economic security and national 
defense. Almost all Latin American and Caribbean countries have 
similar requirements in each of these areas, and this similarity 
permits them to consider the elaboration of a common liner shipping 
policy. To co-ordinate efforts in this matter, each country might 
wish to consider the establishment of an executive committee composed 
of the ministers of economy, trade and transport which would 
collaborate with their counterparts in the region to prepare common 
operational and institutional liner policies. 
1. Operational aspects of a common liner policy. At . present 
almost all countries of this region seek to satisfy their ocean-liner 
transport needs independently. While there are certain differences in 
national economic goals which are utilized to justify such independent 
operations, the long-term shipping crisis has made it necessary to 
join with other lines in efforts to rationalize services. As an 
example of the change in operating policies by shipping lines from 
other regions, the Chairman of Hapag-Lloyd, Hans Jakob Kruse, recently 
indicated that no European line is big enough to go it alone in 
prevailing market conditions. 
In the light of the need for liner operators to rationalize their 
operations with other similarly situated companies, Latin American and 
Caribbean countries might wish to consider the elaboration of a common 
liner policy which could include co-ordination of the independent 
operating patterns of their fleets through (a) three subregional 
consortia -west coast of South America, east coast of South America, 
and Mexico, Central America and Panama, (b) use of Panama's center 
port concept to facilitate container movements between consortia, (c) 
use of rail and road intermodalism to reduce the number of ports of 
call, (d) expansion of West Indies Shipping Corporation (WISCO) 
services to include the broader Caribbean basin, and (e) a systems or 
intermodal approach to (a) through (d) so that, for example, WISCO 
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might deliver cargo to the east coast consortia at a Caribbean 
transshipment center for on carriage to Europe, and vice versa. 
2. Institutional aspects of a common liner policy. The 
structural changes now occuring in ocean-liner transport have created 
a pressing need to evaluate the role accorded cargo reservation 
regimes by Latin American and Caribbean countries. In addition to the 
institutional aspects of a common liner policy presented at part IV., 
countries of the region might also consider what modifications to 
reservation regimes would reflect the ocean-liner transport 
environment of the future and, at the same time, avoid measures 
permitted by the common shipping policy of the EEC and the US Shipping 
Act of 1984. Other matters which might be analyzed include the 
separation of homogenous cargoes from liner transport, its fungible 
nature, the need to use intermodal systems, the control of 
overtonnaging and the formation of regional liner consortia and joint 
ventures in related areas. 

